In short
Bangladeshi garment exporters buy imported fabric on a back-to-back letter of credit opened against the buyer’s credit, and import it duty free into a licensed bonded warehouse. Both are open only to bonded exporters. Central bank dollar loans (the Export Development Fund) were cut from 2023 and cash incentives from 2024, though one incentive rose to 5% in July 2026.
Want a costing for your own style? Send us your enquiry
This chapter is part of a research guide to the Bangladesh garment trade, which has the literature review, the method and the full bibliography.
A Bangladeshi garment exporter that imports its fabric need not pay for it before making the clothes. A bank opens a letter of credit for the fabric against the buyer’s order, customs lets the fabric in without duty on the promise that it will leave again as garments, and the bank pays the fabric supplier months later out of the money the buyer sends. These two arrangements, the back-to-back letter of credit and the special bonded warehouse, sit under the export orders described in chapter 1; in a 2021 survey of garment exporters, 87% used bonded warehouses (Razzaque 2021, 24). Around them the state has added foreign-currency loans from the central bank’s reserves and cash payments on exports.
This chapter asks two questions. How do these instruments work under the rules in force in November 2026, and how have the rules changed since the dollar shortage of 2022? And what does the evidence say about whether they made the industry, and whether the cash payments can survive Bangladesh’s graduation from the least developed country group? I read the rules themselves: Bangladesh Bank’s circulars, most of them in Bangla, the customs rules of 2024 and the WTO’s subsidy agreement. The buyer’s side of payment terms is covered in CMB’s guide to payment terms; this chapter is about what happens inside Bangladesh after the buyer’s letter of credit arrives.
How a back-to-back letter of credit works
A letter of credit is a bank’s promise to pay a seller when the seller presents the documents the credit lists. The International Chamber of Commerce publishes the rules most banks apply to such credits, UCP 600; I name them only, because the ICC holds the copyright in the text. A garment export starts with such a credit, opened by the buyer’s bank in the factory’s favour. In Bangladesh it is called the master export LC. A sales contract can take its place.
The factory then asks its own bank, the “lien bank” through which a bond licence holder must conduct all its imports and exports (NBR 2024b, 2), to open a second credit, this time as importer, to buy fabric, yarn and trims from a supplier abroad. That second credit is the back-to-back LC. Its security is the master credit: the bank expects to be repaid from the export proceeds that the master credit will bring in. Bangladesh Bank’s rules set the terms. From 2018 they were in chapter 7 of the Guidelines for Foreign Exchange Transactions (Bangladesh Bank 2018, chap. 7, paras. 38–42). On 14 August 2025 Bangladesh Bank gathered its import rules into one circular, which repealed the import instructions of the guidelines (Bangladesh Bank 2025f, 1), and on 13 August 2026 an updated consolidated circular replaced that one; its Part G carries the 2018 rules on back-to-back credit almost word for word (Bangladesh Bank 2026g, 1, 19–20). In both the 2018 and the 2026 texts:
- Only “recognized export oriented industrial units” working under the bonded warehouse system may use the facility, and the firm must hold a valid bonded warehouse licence (Bangladesh Bank 2026g, 19; Bangladesh Bank 2018, chap. 7, para. 39(i)). The two instruments are tied together by law: no bond licence, no back-to-back credit.
- The back-to-back credit may not exceed an “admissible percentage” of the net FOB value of the master credit, that is, its value less freight, insurance and any commission the exporter pays. The percentage follows the value addition requirement that the Ministry of Commerce prescribes (Bangladesh Bank 2026g, 19).
- The credit is opened on usance (deferred payment) terms. Under the 2018 guidelines the limit was 180 days (Bangladesh Bank 2018, chap. 7, para. 39(iv)); the changes since 2022 are described below. Credits funded from the Export Development Fund may be at sight (Bangladesh Bank 2026g, 19).
- At maturity the bank pays the foreign supplier from the export proceeds, which it sets aside in a separate foreign currency account. It must pay at maturity “even where for some reason export has not taken place”, and then seek Bangladesh Bank’s approval after the event and report the failed export to the National Board of Revenue (NBR) (Bangladesh Bank 2026g, 20).
- Banks must watch the stock of inputs bought on back-to-back credit and report any sign of “illegal disposal of stocks from the bond” to customs (Bangladesh Bank 2026g, 20).
Two features matter for researchers. The first is that the bank, not the foreign supplier, carries the risk of export failure: the supplier is paid even if the garments never ship. In my reading, that is why the rules lean so heavily on the bond licence and on customs checks. The second is the inland back-to-back LC, denominated in foreign currency and opened in favour of a local mill that supplies yarn or fabric to an exporter. The local mill can in turn open its own back-to-back import credit against it (Bangladesh Bank 2026g, 19–20; Bangladesh Bank 2018, chap. 7, para. 40). This is how a spinning or knitting mill that never ships abroad becomes a “deemed exporter” paid in dollars, and in my view it is part of why the knit side of the industry could build its own supply base, the subject of chapter 5.
Export proceeds must come home within four months under a Bangladesh Bank notification of 1977 (Bangladesh Bank 2026f, 2); the EDF circular and the customs rules write the same limit as 120 days (Bangladesh Bank 2026d, 2; NBR 2024b, 6). A bank may let an exporter keep the part of the proceeds needed for back-to-back payments in a single foreign currency pool rather than convert it to taka (Bangladesh Bank 2018, chap. 7, para. 42(i)).
How much of the export value can be spent on imported inputs
The ceiling on a back-to-back credit is a share of the master credit, and the share comes from the Import Policy Order, not from Bangladesh Bank. The customs rules of 2024 repeat that the total of all back-to-back credits under one master credit or sales contract may not exceed the limit in the Import Policy Order in force (NBR 2024b, 4). Yunus and Yamagata report that the revised import policy of 1993 capped a back-to-back credit at 70% of the master credit, which guaranteed 30% net foreign exchange earnings on each export (Yunus and Yamagata 2012, 5).
I could not find the current general percentage in a text I could read. The Import Policy Order 2021–2024, gazetted on 24 April 2022, does contain a table of minimum value addition for garments: 20% for woven and knit garments up to US$60 FOB a dozen, 10% above US$60 a dozen and 15% for all children’s wear (Ministry of Commerce 2022, 7757). But the table sits under the clause on imports on a “no-cost basis”, where the buyer supplies the fabric free and the factory is paid for cutting and making (Ministry of Commerce 2022, 7756–57), and the 2015–2018 order has a no-cost table of the same kind, with 20%, 15% and 10% rates (Ministry of Commerce 2016, 43–44). Another clause of the 2021–2024 order leaves the back-to-back ceiling for other export goods to a maximum percentage published by the Export Promotion Bureau (Ministry of Commerce 2022, 7757). A new order for 2026–2029 was issued in August 2026; according to a press report it gives export-oriented industries “greater scope” to import inputs free of cost (bdnews24.com 2026). I did not find its text. The exact ceiling that applies to an ordinary garment back-to-back credit in 2026 is therefore one of the things this chapter leaves open.
The special bonded warehouse
A bonded warehouse is a place where imported goods can stay without duty being paid, under customs control. Bangladesh’s “special bonded warehouse” is a variant for manufacturers: the factory’s own store is licensed as a bonded warehouse, fabric and trims enter it duty free, and the duty becomes payable only if the goods are not exported. It is a duty suspension, not a refund. The exporter never pays duty and then claims it back, as under a drawback scheme.
The legal basis, then and now
Until 2023 the regime rested on the warehousing sections of the Customs Act, 1969. A World Bank assessment of 2015 found that the Act said little about manufacturing in bond. The Board and the Bond Commissioner relied on general powers: section 13 on licensing private warehouses, section 19 on exemption from duty, section 86 on the warehouse bond (a penalty of twice the duty) and section 95 on manufacturing in a warehouse (O’Shea 2015, 2–3). Special bonded warehouses were defined as private warehouses for “100% export oriented industries” not locked by customs; goods could stay two years, and could be cleared for home use only with permission asked fifteen days ahead (O’Shea 2015, 3). The detailed rules were in orders and SROs going back to 1984 or earlier (O’Shea 2015, 4). The assessment’s first finding was that “the regime lacks a clear, comprehensive legal basis” (O’Shea 2015, i).
That has changed. The rules of 2024 were made under the Customs Act, 2023 (Act No. 57 of 2023). On 29 May 2024 the government issued new Warehouse Licensing Rules, in force from 6 June 2024, which repeal the Bonded Warehouse Licensing Rules of 2008 (NBR 2024a, 1, 11), and separate rules for direct export-oriented garment factories (NBR 2024b, 1). The garment rules apply to every direct export-oriented woven and knit garment manufacturer in Bangladesh (NBR 2024b, 1).
The utilisation declaration
The working document of the system is the utilisation declaration, or UD. The 2024 rules define it as a declaration, certified by a business association that customs has authorised, that lists the exporter, the export contract or credit, the raw materials and quantities needed, the consumption per garment, every back-to-back credit under the export order and the shipment dates (NBR 2024b, 1–2). In practice the associations are the two industry bodies: the factory files the UD in the automated system of BGMEA or BKMEA with a copy of the master credit or contract, the proforma invoice, a sketch of the garment and its current general bond, and the association checks it and sends it to the Commissioner of Customs (Bond) (NBR 2024b, 2–3). (The difference between the two associations is explained in CMB’s guide.)
Three rules in the 2024 text show how the UD is meant to close the circle. No raw material outside a UD may enter the warehouse or be released from it for home use. Every back-to-back credit opened under a master credit must be included in its UD, and none may be added after the goods have shipped (NBR 2024b, 3). And each customs licensing office must have a UD verification committee, with experts from the associations and from the Bangladesh University of Textiles or a similar institution, to check the declared consumption and wastage rates; it must meet at least once every six months (NBR 2024b, 3–4).
The rules also allow imports free of cost, where the buyer supplies the fabric, up to the quantity needed to make one third of the factory’s exports in the previous audit period (NBR 2024b, 4). Each licence holder files an annual import and export statement within 60 days of the year’s end, and customs must finish the audit within 90 days of receiving the papers (NBR 2024b, 7). Two bonded factories may subcontract work to each other, and the Commissioner takes a bank guarantee equal to the duty and tax on the goods moved, released when they come back (NBR 2024b, 7–9).
The 2015 assessment described a system run almost entirely on paper. Customs kept handwritten passbooks recording every import and export, largely duplicating the bills of entry; licence holders gave an undertaking rather than a bank guarantee or other financial security; and BGMEA issued about 100 UDs and 300 to 400 UD amendments a day (O’Shea 2015, ii, iv). The Bond Commissionerate audited each garment manufacturer once every two or three years (O’Shea 2015, ii). I have not found a later published assessment, so I cannot say how much of this the 2024 rules and the BGMEA and BKMEA online systems have changed in practice.
Leakage of bonded goods into the local market
The weakness of a duty-free regime is that duty-free fabric is worth more in the home market than in the export order. The World Bank team reported that customs officials justified checking every transaction by “a perception that the bonded warehouse regime is highly subject to misuse”, and added that it was “not clear how effective” those controls were (O’Shea 2015, 25). Yunus and Yamagata note that the “illegal infiltration” of duty-free inputs into the domestic market hampers local backward linkages, and that this fear kept the government from allowing a central bonded warehouse (Yunus and Yamagata 2012, 17). The Bangladesh Bank rule that banks must report signs of illegal disposal from the bond, quoted above, exists for the same reason.
What I could not find is a measurement. In November 2026 the NBR’s Central Intelligence Cell reported, through the news agency UNB, two cases of alleged diversion: in the larger, about 78% of 2,862 tonnes of polyester fabric imported under 41 UDs, some 2,237 tonnes, was missing from the factory with no matching exports, and the duty and tax evaded was put at about Tk 94.7 crore (UNB 2026). Single cases show the mechanism, not its scale. A research project of the SOAS Anti-Corruption Evidence consortium with BIGD at BRAC University set out to estimate the effective protection of the domestic textile industry “given the scale of smuggling” from bonded warehouses, using NBR and Bond Commissionerate data (SOAS ACE n.d.); its project page reports no results, and I found no published output. Figures for leakage that circulate in the press come from industry interviews, not from customs data, and I have left them out.
Where the two instruments came from
The early history is told with full references in CMB’s cited history of the industry, so I give only what bears on finance. Rhee and Belot, writing from field interviews of the late 1980s, say that Desh Garments and its Korean partner Daewoo saw a duty-free regime for inputs as vital and appear to have had “a large hand” in the arrangements, after which the government introduced the special bonded warehouse for 100% export-oriented garment factories. They concede that “there is no documented evidence” of Daewoo’s role. The government gave no import finance but let local banks open back-to-back credits against export credits under strict exchange controls (Rhee and Belot 1990, 10–11). In the first years Daewoo itself received the buyer’s credit and opened a back-to-back credit in Desh’s favour, a chain they call “triangular trade” (Rhee and Belot 1990, 11). Rhee’s journal article built the case into what its title calls a “catalyst model of development” (Rhee 1990).
The sources do not agree on the date. Rhee and Belot place both instruments in Desh’s first years without a year (Rhee and Belot 1990, 10–11). Yunus and Yamagata write that Bangladesh Bank granted both in 1980 (Yunus and Yamagata 2012, 17), and a World Bank working paper also gives 1980 (Kabir, Singh, and Ferrantino 2019, 12). Fakhruzzaman dates both to 1984 and uses 1984 as the start of his policy variable (Fakhruzzaman 2025, 8, 22). None of them cites a circular or customs order of the time, and I found none. Mostafa and Klepper, from interviews with the first generation of entrepreneurs, add that the entrepreneurs pressed for three policies (duty-free machinery, bonded warehouses and back-to-back credit) and that beyond those the government “did not aid the industry in any significant way” (Mostafa and Klepper 2009, 6).
Why did these two instruments matter so much? Because they removed the two costs that a new firm in a poor country could not carry: duty on imported fabric at a time of high tariffs, and the working capital to buy that fabric in foreign exchange. Yunus and Yamagata put it plainly: back-to-back credit “eliminated the need for cash for working capital”, which let entrepreneurs start factories with little capital (Yunus and Yamagata 2012, 5). Fakhruzzaman, citing the World Bank, notes that inputs could exceed 65% of the cost of a garment (Fakhruzzaman 2025, 9).
The Export Development Fund and the taka funds that followed
The Export Development Fund (EDF) is a pool of US dollars held by Bangladesh Bank from which banks can borrow to finance their foreign currency loans to manufacturer-exporters for inputs (Bangladesh Bank 2018, chap. 8, para. 24). It pays for inputs bought on back-to-back and inland back-to-back credits, and for bulk imports of cotton, yarn and other inputs by the mills that supply exporters (Bangladesh Bank 2026d, 2–3). The current rules are in a master circular of 23 July 2026, which repealed the 2017 procedure and its amendments (Bangladesh Bank 2026d, cover letter):
- Banks pay Bangladesh Bank six-month SOFR plus 0.5% and charge exporters six-month SOFR plus 1.5% (Bangladesh Bank 2026d, 1).
- Loans are repaid from the export proceeds, in all cases within 180 days, extendable to 270 days (Bangladesh Bank 2026d, 1).
- An exporter that has not repatriated export proceeds within 120 days, or a bank that has not repaid the fund on time, loses access (Bangladesh Bank 2026d, 2).
- For back-to-back imports, each exporter’s loans are capped at the lower of the input value allowed under the value addition rules and a limit set by its association: US$20 million for a BGMEA member and US$15 million for a BKMEA member. A member of the textile mills’ association importing cotton and other fibres in bulk may borrow the lower of US$20 million and what it earned in dollars on inland back-to-back credits in the previous twelve months (Bangladesh Bank 2026d, 2–3).
Growth and cuts
Bangladesh Bank does not, as far as I could find, publish a series of the fund’s size, so the figures here come from the World Bank and the IMF. The World Bank reports that the EDF was raised to US$7 billion during the COVID-19 pandemic, and that Bangladesh Bank “reduced the EDF by US$ 2.6 billion to US$ 4.6 billion as of July 2023” while cutting the ceiling for individual exporters from US$15 million to US$10 million (World Bank 2023, 18). The figures do not add up: US$7 billion less US$2.6 billion is US$4.4 billion, not US$4.6 billion. The report does not say from what level the cut was measured or which figure is rounded.
The reason for the cuts was the reserves. The EDF is lent out of foreign exchange reserves, and the BPM6 standard that Bangladesh Bank adopted in July 2023 excludes it from gross reserves (World Bank 2023, 18). Under the IMF programme agreed in January 2023, net international reserves are gross reserves under BPM6 less the central bank’s foreign currency liabilities and “reserves earmarked for quasi-fiscal activities”, and the EDF is the first of five such schemes in foreign currency (IMF 2025, 45). The programme puts an indicative ceiling on the combined stock of these schemes (IMF 2025, 100); the June 2025 review set ceilings falling from US$4,013.3 million at the end of June 2025 to US$3,770.4 million at the end of June 2026 (IMF 2025, 45). Because that ceiling covers all five schemes, it is not a figure for the EDF alone.
The limits per exporter moved with the reserves. In January 2022 the limit for a member of BGMEA or the textile mills’ association was raised from US$25 million to US$30 million, an increase extended to December 2022 (Bangladesh Bank 2022b). In April 2023 the general limit for back-to-back imports was cut from US$15 million to US$10 million, with BGMEA members at US$20 million and BKMEA members at US$15 million (Bangladesh Bank 2023b), the figures still in force in 2026 (Bangladesh Bank 2026d, 2–3). The interest rate rose too: in February 2023 Bangladesh Bank charged banks 3.00% and banks charged exporters 4.50%; from September 2024 both became market rates linked to SOFR (Bangladesh Bank 2024f).
The taka replacements
As the dollar fund shrank, Bangladesh Bank created a fund in taka. The Export Facilitation Pre-finance Fund (EFPF), set up on 1 January 2023 with Tk 10,000 crore of the central bank’s own money, lends to exporters and deemed exporters for raw materials bought on back-to-back credits, at no more than 4% to the customer, with banks paying 1.5% to Bangladesh Bank (Bangladesh Bank 2023a, 1–2). Garment exporters could draw up to the value of the inputs or Tk 200 crore, whichever was lower (Bangladesh Bank 2023a, 2). From July 2023 the rates became 5% and 2% (Bangladesh Bank 2023d). In 2026 the fund was turned towards a refinance scheme for pre-shipment credit: up to Tk 5,000 crore of it was allocated to that scheme in April, and in October the scheme was raised to Tk 7,000 crore by moving Tk 2,000 crore from the EFPF, whose size was set at Tk 3,000 crore, with new loans at no more than 6% (Bangladesh Bank 2026i).
Researchers should note what this means. A back-to-back credit is a dollar liability. In my reading, financing it in taka moves the exchange rate risk from the central bank’s reserves to the exporter and its bank. I found no study of how exporters responded.
| Date | Rule | Change | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 6 January 2022 | Usance for industrial raw materials, including back-to-back imports | Extended from 180 to 270 days | Bangladesh Bank 2022c |
| 6 January 2022 | EDF limit, member mills of BTMA and BGMEA | Raised from US$25 million to US$30 million, to 30 June 2022 | Bangladesh Bank 2022b |
| 4 July 2022 | Cash margin on import letters of credit | 100% for a list of goods including cars, gold and finished garments; at least 75% for other goods, except essentials and the capital machinery and raw materials of export-oriented and other industries | Bangladesh Bank 2022a |
| 19 July 2022 | EDF limit of US$30 million | Extended to 31 December 2022 | Bangladesh Bank 2022b |
| 20 July 2022 | Usance for industrial raw materials, including back-to-back imports | Extended to 360 days, to 31 December 2022; not for imports under EDF loans | Bangladesh Bank 2022c |
| 1 January 2023 | Export Facilitation Pre-finance Fund | Created with Tk 10,000 crore; at most 4% to the customer | Bangladesh Bank 2023a, 1–2 |
| 1 February 2023 | EDF interest | 3.00% to banks, 4.50% to exporters | Bangladesh Bank 2024f |
| 9 April 2023 | EDF limit for back-to-back imports | Cut from US$15 million to US$10 million; BGMEA members US$20 million, BKMEA members US$15 million | Bangladesh Bank 2023b |
| 13 August 2023 | EFPF interest, new loans from 1 July 2023 | At most 5% to the customer; banks pay 2% | Bangladesh Bank 2023d |
| 14 December 2023 | 360-day usance (renewed in June 2023) | Extended to 30 June 2024 | Bangladesh Bank 2023f |
| 1 September 2024 | EDF interest | SOFR plus 0.5% to banks, SOFR plus 1.5% to exporters | Bangladesh Bank 2024f |
| 20 January 2025 | 360-day usance | Continued to 31 December 2025 | Bangladesh Bank 2025a |
| 14 August 2025 | Consolidated import circular | Import rules gathered in one circular; the import instructions of the 2018 guidelines repealed | Bangladesh Bank 2025f, 1 |
| 29 December 2025 | Usance for industrial raw materials | Up to 270 days or the cash conversion cycle, whichever is earlier; for back-to-back credits, set in line with the period for repatriating export proceeds | Bangladesh Bank 2025e |
| 9 April 2026 | Pre-shipment credit refinance scheme | Up to Tk 5,000 crore of the EFPF allocated to it | Bangladesh Bank 2026i |
| 23 July 2026 | EDF master circular | Six-month SOFR plus 0.5% and 1.5%; 180 days, extendable to 270; association limits restated | Bangladesh Bank 2026d, 1–3 |
| 13 August 2026 | Consolidated import circular | Back-to-back rules restated in Part G; usance up to 270 days under Part D | Bangladesh Bank 2026g, 14, 19–20 |
| 16 September 2026 | Local deliveries under back-to-back credit | EDF bulk finance only if local delivery bills are not outstanding beyond 270 days | Bangladesh Bank 2026h |
| 1 October 2026 | Pre-shipment credit refinance scheme | Raised to Tk 7,000 crore by moving Tk 2,000 crore from the EFPF, which is set at Tk 3,000 crore; at most 6% to the customer | Bangladesh Bank 2026i |
Cash incentives on garment exports
The fourth instrument is a cash payment, calculated as a percentage of the net FOB value of an export, which Bangladesh Bank announces each year for the government and banks pay out after an external audit of each claim (Bangladesh Bank 2025b, 1). For garments it has five parts, which the circulars list separately:
- Alternative cash assistance “in lieu of bond and duty drawback” for the export-oriented domestic textile sector. As the name says, it is paid in place of the bond and drawback facilities, that is, on exports made with inputs that were not imported duty free.
- An extra payment for textile exporters to the euro area, on top of the alternative cash assistance.
- An extra facility for small and medium firms in export garments, knit, woven and sweater.
- New product or new market assistance, for exports outside the main markets, which have been listed as the United States, Canada and the EU, and from 2022 the UK.
- Special cash assistance for the garment sector.
The 2021 circular, for example, requires at least 30% local value addition for all of them, worked out by deducting the imported content from the net FOB value (Bangladesh Bank 2021, 2).
The rates were unchanged from 2021 to 2023 and then fell in two steps (table below). On 30 January 2024 Bangladesh Bank explained why. The incentives are, under WTO rules, a subsidy “contingent upon export performance”; the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures forbids them once a country leaves the least developed group; graduation was due in 2026; and withdrawing them all at once could hurt exporters, so the government had decided to reduce them gradually from 1 January 2024 (Bangladesh Bank 2024a, 1). That first circular also removed five garment headings (HS 6105, 6107, 6109, 6110 and 6203) from the textile incentives altogether and narrowed the “new market” list by excluding India, Japan and Australia (Bangladesh Bank 2024a, 2). Thirteen days later a second circular cancelled it, moved the start of the new rates to 1 February 2024, dropped the exclusion of the five headings and restored the old market list (Bangladesh Bank 2024b, 1–2). The second circular does not say which rates applied to shipments made in January 2024.
From July 2024 the rates were cut again; the alternative cash assistance fell from 3.00% to 1.50% and the special cash assistance from 0.50% to 0.30% (Bangladesh Bank 2024c, 2). In the June 2025 review of the IMF programme, the government wrote that it had “lowered export incentives” for apparel, leather and jute in the FY25 budget and planned “to phase them out completely in FY26” (IMF 2025, 68). The circulars I read do not show that. The rates for July to December 2025 and for January to June 2026 were the same as for FY25 (Bangladesh Bank 2025b, 2; Bangladesh Bank 2026a, 2). In November 2025 the special cash assistance was extended to garments made by subcontracting, provided the exporter owns a running factory (Bangladesh Bank 2025d). And for FY2026–27, after announcing unchanged rates on 5 July 2026 (Bangladesh Bank 2026b, 2), Bangladesh Bank raised the alternative cash assistance from 1.50% to 5.00% a week later, on condition that the exporter proves it bought its yarn or fabric from local sources (Bangladesh Bank 2026c). Meanwhile the UN General Assembly has postponed Bangladesh’s graduation to November 2029 (Shah 2026). I have not found an official statement that connects the higher rate to the later graduation date.
| Shipments made | Alternative cash assistance (in lieu of bond or duty drawback) | Extra for euro-area exports | Extra for small and medium firms | New product or new market | Special cash assistance, garments | Circular |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022 | 4.00 | 2.00 | 4.00 | 4.00 (not the US, Canada or EU) | 1.00 | FE Circular 29, 20 September 2021: Bangladesh Bank 2021, annex |
| 1 July 2022 to 30 June 2023 | 4.00 | 2.00 | 4.00 | 4.00 (not the US, Canada, EU or UK) | 1.00 | FE Circular 26, 19 September 2022: Bangladesh Bank 2022e, annex |
| From 1 July 2023, until further instructions | 4.00 | 2.00 | 4.00 | 4.00 (not the US, Canada, EU or UK) | 1.00 | FE Circular 13, 24 August 2023: Bangladesh Bank 2023e, annex |
| 1 January to 30 June 2024 (circular cancelled on 12 February 2024) | 3.00 | 1.00 | 4.00 | 3.00 (not the US, Canada, EU, UK, India, Japan or Australia) | 0.50 | FE Circular 02, 30 January 2024: Bangladesh Bank 2024a, annex |
| 1 February to 30 June 2024 | 3.00 | 1.00 | 4.00 | 3.00 (not the US, Canada, EU or UK) | 0.50 | FE Circular 05, 12 February 2024: Bangladesh Bank 2024b, annex |
| 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025 | 1.50 | 0.50 | 3.00 | 2.00 (not the US, Canada, EU or UK) | 0.30 | FE Circular 12, 30 June 2024: Bangladesh Bank 2024c, annex |
| 1 July to 31 December 2025 | 1.50 | 0.50 | 3.00 | 2.00 (not the US, Canada, EU or UK) | 0.30 | FE Circular 28, 10 July 2025: Bangladesh Bank 2025b, annex |
| 1 January to 30 June 2026 | 1.50 | 0.50 | 3.00 | 2.00 (not the US, Canada, EU or UK) | 0.30 | FEPD-1 Circular 04, 12 January 2026: Bangladesh Bank 2026a, annex |
| 1 July 2026 to 30 June 2027 | 5.00, with proof of local yarn or fabric (1.50 in the first circular) | 0.50 | 3.00 | 2.00 (not the US, Canada, EU or UK) | 0.30 | FEPD-1 Circulars 17 and 19, 5 and 12 July 2026: Bangladesh Bank 2026b, annex; Bangladesh Bank 2026c |
How much does all this cost, and who gets it? Razzaque reports that Bangladesh spent about US$560 million on export incentives for 36 items in 2019 and that apparel took 70% of all cash incentives (Razzaque 2021, 15). A working paper by M. M. Rahman gives a much larger figure, about 3.7% of GDP, but it counts duty drawback and bonded warehouses together with cash payments, and it dates the figure to 2018 on one page and 2019 on another (M. M. Rahman 2023, 1, 3). The two are not measuring the same thing. In my reading, a figure that includes duty not collected on bonded fabric measures revenue forgone on goods that would mostly not have been imported for home use at all. Neither study shows the calculation in full. The combined rate open to an apparel exporter is also put differently: 4 to 8% of FOB value, “depending on the types of products being exported and destination countries”, in Razzaque’s report (Razzaque 2021, 23), and 4 to 7% in a later report for the International Growth Centre (Razzaque, Islam, and Rahman 2023, 28). Both are stated ranges, not averages measured from claims.
The dollar shortage and back-to-back credit, 2022 to 2024
From 2022 Bangladesh ran short of dollars. In FY2023 gross reserves fell from 4.8 to 3.5 months of prospective imports, and Bangladesh Bank’s sales of dollars became the main source of dollar liquidity between banks (World Bank 2023, 18). In July 2022 it required cash margins of at least 75% on most import letters of credit and 100% on a list of goods judged non-essential, paid from the importer’s own funds; the capital machinery and raw materials of export-oriented industries were exempt (Bangladesh Bank 2022a). The World Bank reports that letter of credit openings “plummeted by 26.8 percent” in FY23 (World Bank 2023, 15). The taka was devalued in steps, from 110 to 117 per dollar in May 2024 and to 122 in December 2024 (IMF 2025, 8).
Back-to-back credits were treated more gently than other imports. They were exempt from the margin rules, and their usance period was stretched to 360 days for most of the time between July 2022 and December 2025 (table above; I did not find a circular covering January to June 2023), which gave exporters a year to pay for inputs. The trade-off was a larger stock of short-term dollar liabilities in the banks. Bangladesh Bank’s monthly bulletin, Major Economic Indicators, reports fresh openings of back-to-back credits as a line under total import credits, and projects the banks’ liabilities on them for the next three months.
| Fiscal year | Back-to-back LCs opened | Back-to-back LCs settled | All import LCs opened | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2021 | 8,999.27 | 7,505.77 | 67,037.42 | Bangladesh Bank 2022d, 25 |
| FY2022 | 12,582.73 | 11,772.11 | 92,234.69 | Bangladesh Bank 2022d, 25 |
| FY2023 | 8,601.91 | 9,544.00 | 68,247.31 | Bangladesh Bank 2024e, 35 |
| FY2024 | 9,735.37 | 8,866.67 | 68,892.31 | Bangladesh Bank 2025c, 35 |
| FY2025 | 10,620.62 | 10,629.98 | 69,851.23 | Bangladesh Bank 2026e, 23 |
| FY2026 (provisional) | 10,265.71 | 9,859.98 | 74,458.83 | Bangladesh Bank 2026e, 23 |
By my arithmetic from these figures, back-to-back openings fell by 31.6% from FY2022 to FY2023, a little more than total openings (26.0%), and settlements exceeded openings in FY2023 as credits opened in the boom year fell due. Back-to-back credits were between 12.6% and 15.2% of all import credits in every year. My figure for the fall in total openings differs from the World Bank’s 26.8%, probably because the bulletin revises its figures; the August 2024 issue gives FY2024 back-to-back openings as US$9,698.56 million (Bangladesh Bank 2024e, 35) and the July 2025 issue as US$9,735.37 million (Bangladesh Bank 2025c, 35), and FY2025 moved from US$10,440.66 million (Bangladesh Bank 2025c, 35) to US$10,620.62 million (Bangladesh Bank 2026e, 23).
The fall in FY2023 cannot be read as an effect of the dollar shortage alone. Back-to-back credits follow export orders, and the same data cannot separate orders that were not placed from inputs that could not be paid for. The bulletin’s projections of the banks’ liabilities on back-to-back credits are a better measure of the strain, because Bangladesh Bank expresses them as a share of the banks’ own foreign currency holdings.
| Quarter projected | Probable liabilities against back-to-back LCs | Share of banks’ foreign currency holdings | Holdings measured on | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| July to September 2023 | 2,428.50 | 37.01% | 31 July 2023 | Bangladesh Bank 2023c, 26 |
| July to September 2024 | 4,271.24 | 63.31% | 31 July 2024 | Bangladesh Bank 2024d, 25 |
| July to September 2025 | 2,664.76 | 49.97% | 31 July 2025 | Bangladesh Bank 2025c, 25 |
| July to September 2026 | 2,916.15 | 60.25% | 30 July 2026 | Bangladesh Bank 2026e, 23 |
The bulletin does not explain the jump in 2024. In my reading, part of it may come from the recovery of back-to-back openings in FY2024, since credits opened on 360-day terms fall due about a year later; but the usance period was also 360 days in 2023, so that cannot be the whole explanation, and the share also moves with the banks’ foreign currency holdings, not only with the liabilities. The August 2024 issue put the share at 75.19% for August to October 2024 (Bangladesh Bank 2024e, 25). I have not found a study that links these liabilities to bank stress or to delays in paying foreign fabric suppliers.
What the literature says about these tools as industrial policy
The literature agrees that back-to-back credit and bonded warehouses mattered at the start. It disagrees on how much, and it has barely begun to test what they do now.
The founding view. Rhee and Belot treat the two instruments as part of what Daewoo transferred to Desh: “the administrative arrangements for the basic export incentives” of access to inputs at world prices and trade finance at proper cost (Rhee and Belot 1990, 11). Yunus and Yamagata go further and credit the instruments, “formulated based on the prescription of the leading entrepreneurs”, with letting firms start on little capital; they describe the result as a sector insulated “in a policy enclave” from high tariffs and a weak financial system (Yunus and Yamagata 2012, 5, 16). Mostafa and Klepper give the credit to people instead, and treat the policies as a short list of things the state did right (Mostafa and Klepper 2009, 6). The difference matters for policy transfer: if the instruments were decisive, other countries can copy them; if knowledge carried by people was decisive, copying the rules is not enough.
The econometric evidence. I found one time-series test. Fakhruzzaman estimates an export equation for 1976 to 2018 and finds that a dummy variable for the policy instruments, set to 1 from 1984, is significant at the 1% level with a positive sign (Fakhruzzaman 2025, 22, 30). In my reading this shows that exports were higher after 1984 than the other variables predict. It cannot show that the instruments caused the difference, because any other change of the mid-1980s (the rush of new factories in 1985, US quotas, the spread of skills from Desh) loads onto the same dummy, and the year of introduction is itself disputed.
From enabler to constraint? Later work asks whether the tie between the two instruments now holds firms back. A World Bank working paper argues that exporters cannot open credits for inputs until a foreign buyer has placed an order, which makes lead times harder to meet and may explain the spread of subcontracting; it recommends letting banks open credits without an export order (Kabir, Singh, and Ferrantino 2019, 31). A World Bank study of 2005, as summarised in the 2015 bond assessment, had already recommended reviewing the back-to-back requirement and allowing a central bonded warehouse, and the assessment found that neither had been done (O’Shea 2015, 20–21). The 2015 assessment itself argued for risk-based controls in place of checks on every transaction (O’Shea 2015, ii–iv). The Export Policy 2024–2027 asks the NBR to examine a central bonded warehouse for small and medium industries (Ministry of Commerce 2024, 36), and the Import Policy Order 2026–2029, as reported in the press, for the first time includes provisions for central bonded warehouses (bdnews24.com 2026). I have not read the order, so I cannot say what those provisions allow.
What firms say. In Razzaque’s survey of 38 firms in 2021, 87% used bonded warehouses, about two-thirds reported receiving cash assistance, 58% had borrowed from the EDF and 42% used the export credit guarantee scheme. Firms rated bonded warehouses 4.8 out of 5 for importance, ahead of subsidised loans (4.5) and cash assistance (4.4) (Razzaque 2021, 2, 23–24). A sample of 38 firms recruited through the associations is small, and the ratings are opinions, but it is the only firm-level evidence on these instruments together that I found.
Who gains from the cash incentives. Razzaque, Islam and Rahman find that most Bangladeshi garments sold in the EU and UK carry low markups, and suggest that cash incentives of 4 to 7% of FOB value “could have enabled” firms to stay profitable; ending them after graduation “could seriously undermine export profitability” (Razzaque, Islam, and Rahman 2023, 28). M. M. Rahman’s computable general equilibrium model reaches the opposite policy conclusion: halving export subsidies and giving the money to low-income households would raise real GDP by about 0.81% (M. M. Rahman 2023, 1). These are not contradictory findings. One is about firm margins, the other about the economy as a whole, and both are model results rather than observed effects. I found no study that measures what the cash incentives did to Bangladeshi exports, product mix or market diversification.
The WTO rules and what changes at graduation
The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures prohibits two kinds of subsidy: those contingent on export performance, and those contingent on using domestic rather than imported goods (WTO 1994, art. 3.1). The first prohibition does not apply to the developing countries listed in Annex VII (WTO 1994, art. 27.2). Annex VII has two parts: (a) the least developed countries designated by the United Nations, and (b) twenty named developing countries, from Bolivia to Zimbabwe, which keep the exemption until their GNP per capita reaches US$1,000 a year (WTO 1994, annex VII). Bangladesh is covered only by part (a), as an LDC.
The instruments in this chapter fall on different sides of that line. A drawback or remission of import duty on inputs consumed in making an export is not an export subsidy unless it exceeds the duty actually levied (WTO 1994, annex I(i)). The government’s Export Policy 2024–2027 draws the consequence: duty drawback, export processing zones, back-to-back letters of credit and special bonded warehouses are not export subsidies, while cash incentives, income tax rebates and the currency retention scheme are. It adds that export credit guarantees that do not cover their long-run costs, and interest subsidies and export funds priced below international market rates, may also count (Ministry of Commerce 2024, 32). The move of the EDF to SOFR-linked rates in 2024 can be read in that light, though the circular gives “global market trends” as its reason (Bangladesh Bank 2024f).
Three questions are open. The first is whether graduated LDCs leave Annex VII. The agreement says nothing about graduation; the WTO Secretariat’s reading is that, without a decision, graduated LDCs would no longer be covered, and that of the graduating members only Bangladesh and Nepal would be affected (WTO 2020, 20–21). The LDC Group has proposed that graduated LDCs with GNI per capita below US$1,000 in 1990 dollars be treated like Annex VII(b) countries; the Secretariat calculated Bangladesh’s figure at US$587 in 2017, well below the line (WTO 2020, 21). I found no record of the proposal being adopted.
The second is export competitiveness. A country under Annex VII whose exports of a product reach 3.25% of world trade for two consecutive years must phase out export subsidies on that product over eight years (WTO 1994, arts. 27.5–27.6). Razzaque notes that Bangladesh’s share of world apparel exports, about 6.5%, is above the threshold but that no member has raised it (Razzaque 2021, 15); the Secretariat reported in 2020 that no LDC had been required to phase out a subsidy on these grounds (WTO 2020, 21). The agreement applies the test product by product, a product being “a section heading of the Harmonized System Nomenclature” (WTO 1994, art. 27.6), so a share for apparel as a whole is only a first indication.
The third is local content. The exemption for subsidies contingent on using domestic goods lasted eight years for LDCs from 1995 (WTO 1994, art. 27.3), and the Secretariat notes that graduation therefore changes nothing on that point (WTO 2020, 20). The alternative cash assistance has always been paid in place of bonded imports, and since July 2026 the 5% rate requires proof of local yarn or fabric (Bangladesh Bank 2026c). Whether a payment of that kind is consistent with Article 3.1(b) is a question for trade lawyers; I raise it because I found no published analysis of it.
For buyers, the duty-free access that graduation puts at risk is covered in CMB’s guide to LDC graduation.
What the research does not yet tell us
- The current value addition ceiling. The share of a master credit that can be spent on imported inputs is set in the Import Policy Order, but I could not find a readable current text that states it for ordinary garment exports. A table of these ceilings since 1993 would let researchers test how the rule shaped local sourcing.
- The size of leakage. There is no published estimate, from customs data, of how much bonded fabric reaches the home market. Matching UD quantities against export volumes, which the UD system was built to do, could produce one. It matters for the local textile industry, for revenue and for any claim that the bond regime is a cost to the state.
- A series for the EDF. The fund’s size is known only from occasional statements in World Bank and IMF documents, and the published figures do not add up. A monthly series of outstanding EDF loans by sector would show how far garment exporters depended on central bank dollars.
- The effect of cash incentives. I found no study that measures what the incentives did to exports, product mix or new markets. The changes of 2024, which cut rates across the board and briefly removed five HS headings, are a natural experiment that customs data could exploit.
- Back-to-back credit by industry. Bangladesh Bank reports back-to-back openings for all sectors together. Without a garment line, the effect of the dollar shortage on garment input imports can only be inferred.
- Who carries the cost of the instruments. Bank fees, margins and the cost of usance credit are part of every garment price, but I found no study of how they are shared between factory, bank and buyer, or how they compare with open account terms. Chapter 2 shows how much of the risk buyers already pass to factories.
- The WTO position after 2029. Whether Bangladesh can keep any cash incentive after graduation, and whether the local-content condition added in 2026 is compatible with the subsidy agreement, has not been analysed in the published literature I found.
How I researched this chapter
I carried out this review with the help of AI research tools, which searched for, read and summarised the sources and drafted the text to my brief; a separate AI check then reopened the sources and tested every figure, quotation and citation. I set the questions and the rules, and I am responsible for what is published here.
This chapter is a desk review of published rules, data and research. I did no interviews, fieldwork or archive visits. I read the sources on 22 November 2026 and cite only what I read on the page cited. Many of Bangladesh Bank’s circulars are in Bangla, some set in a font that does not convert to text; I read those in the original, and the scanned circular of 12 February 2024 from page images. Translations of their wording are mine.
I read in full, or in full for the parts cited: the 2018 foreign exchange guidelines (chapters 7 and 8); the Bangladesh Bank circulars in the reference list, including the consolidated import and export circulars of 2026 and the EDF master circular; the July and August issues of Major Economic Indicators from 2022 to 2026; the two NBR customs rules of 2024; the relevant pages of the Import Policy Order 2021–2024 and the Export Policy 2024–2027; the SCM Agreement; the WTO Secretariat’s report on LDC graduation; the IMF country report 25/150; the World Bank’s October 2023 update and its 2015 bond assessment; Rhee and Belot (1990); Mostafa and Klepper (2009); Yunus and Yamagata (2012); Kabir, Singh and Ferrantino (2019); Razzaque (2021); Razzaque, Islam and Rahman (2023); M. M. Rahman (2023); and Fakhruzzaman (2025). For Rhee (1990) I could open only the bibliographic record, so I cite it only for its argument as its title states it.
What I could not verify: the general value addition ceiling for garment back-to-back credits in the current Import Policy Order; the Import Policy Order 2026–2029, whose text I did not find; the size of the EDF from a Bangladesh Bank source; the date of the first bonded warehouse and back-to-back credit rules; any estimate of bonded-warehouse leakage from customs data; and the full-year back-to-back figures for FY2022 as revised in later bulletins. A Bangladesh Bank circular of June 2024 on usance periods is a scanned image I did not read; the table relies on the circulars before and after it, which recite it. I found no circular on the usance period for January to June 2023, between the extension that ended in December 2022 and the renewal of June 2023. What I say about the Import Policy Order 2026–2029 comes from a press report, not the order.
On my own position: I co-founded CMB Sourcing Ltd. The firm makes knitwear and caps in its own factory, the factory of our sister company, Collective Studio Ltd., where I am Head of Growth, and for other products it works as a buying house, sourcing from partner factories. Firms of both kinds work inside the rules described here, so I have an interest in how they are described. Nothing in this chapter draws on CMB’s own transactions.
Each table on this page can be downloaded as a CSV file under CC BY 4.0. The guide’s method and full bibliography are on the guide’s main page, export and industry figures are in CMB’s export statistics, and other datasets are listed on CMB’s data page. How these figures are measured, and why sources disagree, is the subject of chapter 4.
References
Chicago author-date style. Web pages were read on 22 November 2026 unless the entry says otherwise.
- Bangladesh Bank. 2018. Guidelines for Foreign Exchange Transactions. Vol. 1, summarising instructions as of November 30, 2017. Dhaka: Foreign Exchange Policy Department. Copy hosted by the Bangladesh Export Processing Zones Authority. bepza.gov.bd/public/storage/upload/content-file/GFET-2018.pdf.
- Bangladesh Bank. 2021. “Export Subsidy/Cash Incentive for the Financial Year 2021–2022.” FE Circular No. 29, September 20, 2021. In Bangla. Dhaka: Foreign Exchange Policy Department. www.bb.org.bd/mediaroom/circulars/fepd/sep202021fepd29.pdf.
- Bangladesh Bank. 2022a. “Cash Margin on Opening Import Letters of Credit.” BRPD Circular Letter No. 25, July 4, 2022. In Bangla. Dhaka: Banking Regulation and Policy Department. www.bb.org.bd/mediaroom/circulars/brpd/jul042022brpdl25.pdf.
- Bangladesh Bank. 2022b. “Extended Limit from Export Development Fund (EDF).” FE Circular No. 16, July 19, 2022. Dhaka: Foreign Exchange Policy Department. www.bb.org.bd/mediaroom/circulars/fepd/jul192022fepd16e.pdf.
- Bangladesh Bank. 2022c. “Extension of Usance Period of Import of Industrial Raw Materials.” FE Circular No. 18, July 20, 2022. Dhaka: Foreign Exchange Policy Department. www.bb.org.bd/mediaroom/circulars/fepd/jul202022fepd18e.pdf.
- Bangladesh Bank. 2022d. Major Economic Indicators: Monthly Update, July 2022 (Volume 07/2022). Dhaka: Monetary Policy Department. www.bb.org.bd//pub/monthly/selectedecooind/mejecoindjuly2022.pdf.
- Bangladesh Bank. 2022e. “Export Subsidy/Cash Incentive for the Financial Year 2022–2023.” FE Circular No. 26, September 19, 2022. In Bangla. Dhaka: Foreign Exchange Policy Department. www.bb.org.bd/mediaroom/circulars/fepd/sep192022fepd26.pdf.
- Bangladesh Bank. 2023a. “Establishment of Export Facilitation Pre-finance Fund (EFPF).” BRPD Circular No. 01, January 1, 2023. In Bangla. Dhaka: Banking Regulation and Policy Department. www.bb.org.bd/mediaroom/circulars/brpd/jan012023brpd01.pdf.
- Bangladesh Bank. 2023b. “Ceiling against Borrowing from Export Development Fund (EDF).” FE Circular No. 06, April 9, 2023. Dhaka: Foreign Exchange Policy Department. www.bb.org.bd/mediaroom/circulars/fepd/apr092023fepd06e.pdf.
- Bangladesh Bank. 2023c. Major Economic Indicators: Monthly Update, July 2023 (Volume 07/2023). Dhaka: Monetary Policy Department. www.bb.org.bd//pub/monthly/selectedecooind/07_mei_july_2023.pdf.
- Bangladesh Bank. 2023d. “Export Facilitation Pre-finance Fund (EFPF).” BRPD Circular Letter No. 32, August 13, 2023. In Bangla. Dhaka: Banking Regulation and Policy Department. www.bb.org.bd/mediaroom/circulars/brpd/aug132023brpd32.pdf.
- Bangladesh Bank. 2023e. “Export Subsidy/Cash Incentive for the Financial Year 2023–2024.” FE Circular No. 13, August 24, 2023. In Bangla. Dhaka: Foreign Exchange Policy Department. www.bb.org.bd/mediaroom/circulars/fepd/aug242023fepd13.pdf.
- Bangladesh Bank. 2023f. “Extension of Usance Period against Imports of Industrial Raw Materials.” FE Circular No. 21, December 14, 2023. Dhaka: Foreign Exchange Policy Department. www.bb.org.bd/mediaroom/circulars/fepd/dec142023fepd21e.pdf.
- Bangladesh Bank. 2024a. “Export Subsidy/Cash Incentive for the Financial Year 2023–2024.” FE Circular No. 02, January 30, 2024. In Bangla. Dhaka: Foreign Exchange Policy Department. www.bb.org.bd/mediaroom/circulars/fepd/jan302024fepd02.pdf.
- Bangladesh Bank. 2024b. “Export Subsidy/Cash Incentive for the Financial Year 2023–2024.” FE Circular No. 05, February 12, 2024. In Bangla, scanned. Dhaka: Foreign Exchange Policy Department. www.bb.org.bd/mediaroom/circulars/fepd/feb122024fepd05.pdf.
- Bangladesh Bank. 2024c. “Export Subsidy/Cash Incentive for the Financial Year 2024–25.” FE Circular No. 12, June 30, 2024. In Bangla. Dhaka: Foreign Exchange Policy Department. www.bb.org.bd/mediaroom/circulars/fepd/jun302024fepd12.pdf.
- Bangladesh Bank. 2024d. Major Economic Indicators: Monthly Update, July 2024 (Volume 07/2024). Dhaka: Monetary Policy Department. www.bb.org.bd//pub/monthly/selectedecooind/2024_july.pdf.
- Bangladesh Bank. 2024e. Major Economic Indicators: Monthly Update, August 2024 (Volume 08/2024). Dhaka: Monetary Policy Department. www.bb.org.bd//pub/monthly/selectedecooind/2024_august.pdf.
- Bangladesh Bank. 2024f. “Interest Rate on Borrowing from Export Development Fund (EDF).” FE Circular No. 15, September 1, 2024. Dhaka: Foreign Exchange Policy Department. www.bb.org.bd/mediaroom/circulars/fepd/sep012024fepd15e.pdf.
- Bangladesh Bank. 2025a. “Extension of Usance Period against Imports of Industrial Raw Materials.” FE Circular No. 8, January 20, 2025. Dhaka: Foreign Exchange Policy Department. www.bb.org.bd/mediaroom/circulars/fepd/jan202025fepd08e.pdf.
- Bangladesh Bank. 2025b. “Export Subsidy/Cash Incentive against Exports from July 1, 2025 to December 31, 2025 of the Financial Year 2025–2026.” FE Circular No. 28, July 10, 2025. In Bangla. Dhaka: Foreign Exchange Policy Department. www.bb.org.bd/mediaroom/circulars/fepd/jul102025fepd28.pdf.
- Bangladesh Bank. 2025c. Major Economic Indicators: Monthly Update, July 2025 (Volume 07/2025). Dhaka: Monetary Policy Department. www.bb.org.bd//pub/monthly/selectedecooind/2025_july.pdf.
- Bangladesh Bank. 2025d. “Special Cash Assistance on Exports in the Textile Sector.” FE Circular No. 46, November 12, 2025. In Bangla. Dhaka: Foreign Exchange Policy Department. www.bb.org.bd/mediaroom/circulars/fepd/nov122025fepd46.pdf.
- Bangladesh Bank. 2025e. “Extension of Usance Period against Imports of Industrial Raw Materials.” FE Circular No. 51, December 29, 2025. Dhaka: Foreign Exchange Policy Department. www.bb.org.bd/mediaroom/circulars/fepd/dec292025fepd51e.pdf.
- Bangladesh Bank. 2025f. “Foreign Exchange Regulations regarding Import Transactions.” FE Circular No. 33, August 14, 2025. Dhaka: Foreign Exchange Policy Department. www.bb.org.bd/mediaroom/circulars/fepd/aug142025fepd33e.pdf.
- Bangladesh Bank. 2026a. “Export Subsidy/Cash Incentive for the Financial Year 2025–2026.” FEPD-1 Circular No. 04, January 12, 2026. In Bangla. Dhaka: Foreign Exchange Policy Department-1. www.bb.org.bd/mediaroom/circulars/fepd/jan122026fepd-104.pdf.
- Bangladesh Bank. 2026b. “Export Subsidy/Cash Incentive for the Financial Year 2026–2027.” FEPD-1 Circular No. 17, July 5, 2026. In Bangla. Dhaka: Foreign Exchange Policy Department-1. www.bb.org.bd/mediaroom/circulars/fepd/jul052026fepd-117.pdf.
- Bangladesh Bank. 2026c. “Export Subsidy/Cash Incentive for the Financial Year 2026–2027.” FEPD-1 Circular No. 19, July 12, 2026. In Bangla. Dhaka: Foreign Exchange Policy Department-1. www.bb.org.bd/mediaroom/circulars/fepd/jul122026fepd-119.pdf.
- Bangladesh Bank. 2026d. “Master Circular on Export Development Fund.” FEPD-1 Circular No. 24, July 23, 2026. Dhaka: Foreign Exchange Policy Department-1. www.bb.org.bd/mediaroom/circulars/fepd/jul232026fepd-124e.pdf.
- Bangladesh Bank. 2026e. Major Economic Indicators: Monthly Update, July 2026 (Volume 07/2026). Dhaka: Monetary Policy Department. www.bb.org.bd//pub/monthly/selectedecooind/2026_july.pdf.
- Bangladesh Bank. 2026f. “Consolidated Circular on Foreign Exchange Regulations: Export Trade Transactions.” FEPD-1 Circular No. 26, July 30, 2026. Dhaka: Foreign Exchange Policy Department-1. www.bb.org.bd/mediaroom/circulars/fepd/jul302026fepd-126e.pdf.
- Bangladesh Bank. 2026g. “Consolidated Circular on Foreign Exchange Regulations: Import Transactions.” FEPD-1 Circular No. 30, August 13, 2026. Dhaka: Foreign Exchange Policy Department-1. www.bb.org.bd/mediaroom/circulars/fepd/aug132026fepd-130e.pdf.
- Bangladesh Bank. 2026h. “Determination of Overdue Status against Local Deliveries under Back-to-Back LC.” FEPD-1 Circular No. 36, September 16, 2026. Dhaka: Foreign Exchange Policy Department-1. www.bb.org.bd/mediaroom/circulars/fepd/sep162026fepd-136e.pdf.
- Bangladesh Bank. 2026i. “Increase in the Size and Re-fixation of the Interest Rate of the Refinance Scheme for Pre-Shipment Credit.” BRPD-1 Circular Letter No. 34, October 1, 2026. In Bangla. Dhaka: Banking Regulation and Policy Department-1. www.bb.org.bd/mediaroom/circulars/brpd/oct012026brpd-1l34.pdf.
- bdnews24.com. 2026. “Govt Issues New Import Policy for 2026-29.” The Financial Express (Dhaka), August 25, 2026. thefinancialexpress.com.bd/trade/govt-issues-new-import-policy-for-2026-29.
- Fakhruzzaman, Abul Bashar Mohammed. 2025. “Four Decades in the Global Apparel Value Chain: Evidence from Bangladesh.” Working Papers in Trade and Development No. 2025/01. Canberra: Arndt-Corden Department of Economics, Australian National University. crawford.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/2025-01/ACDE%20T%26D%20%20Bashar%20Fakhruzzaman%202025%2001.pdf.
- IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2025. Bangladesh: Third and Fourth Reviews under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement and the Arrangement under Extended Fund Facility; Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Bangladesh. IMF Country Report 25/150, June 2025. Washington, DC: IMF. www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2025/english/1bgdea2025001-print-pdf.pdf.
- Kabir, Mahfuz, Surendar Singh, and Michael J. Ferrantino. 2019. “The Textile-Clothing Value Chain in India and Bangladesh: How Appropriate Policies Can Promote (or Inhibit) Trade and Investment.” Policy Research Working Paper 8731. Washington, DC: World Bank. documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/101321549556073308/pdf/WPS8731.pdf.
- Ministry of Commerce, Bangladesh. 2016. Import Policy Order, 2015–2018. S.R.O. No. 28-Ain/2016, February 10, 2016. English version. Copy hosted by FAOLEX, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/bgd171057.pdf.
- Ministry of Commerce, Bangladesh. 2022. Import Policy Order 2021–2024. Bangladesh Gazette, extraordinary issue, April 24, 2022. In Bangla. Copy hosted by Bangladesh Customs. hub.bangladeshcustoms.gov.bd/storage/uploads/files/1710392170_IPO%202021-24.pdf.
- Ministry of Commerce, Bangladesh. 2024. Export Policy 2024–2027. English version. Dhaka: Ministry of Commerce. Copy hosted by the Bangladesh Trade Portal. www.bangladeshtradeportal.gov.bd/kcfinder/upload/files/Legal_1756180440.pdf.
- Mostafa, Romel, and Steven Klepper. 2009. “Industrial Development through Tacit Knowledge Seeding: Evidence from the Bangladesh Garment Industry.” Working paper draft, November 2009. www.columbia.edu/~ev2124/igc/spring_2010/papers/mostafa.pdf.
- NBR (National Board of Revenue, Internal Resources Division). 2024a. Warehouse Licensing Rules, 2024. S.R.O. No. 209-Ain/2024/61/Customs, May 29, 2024. In Bangla. Dhaka: Ministry of Finance. nbr.gov.bd/uploads/sros/48._SRO-209-Ain-2024-61-Customs_Bonded-Warehouse-Rules-New_.pdf.
- NBR (National Board of Revenue, Internal Resources Division). 2024b. Direct Export-Oriented Garment Industry (Temporary Import under the Warehouse System, Warehouse Operation and Procedure) Rules, 2024. S.R.O. No. 213-Ain/2024/65/Customs, May 29, 2024. In Bangla. Dhaka: Ministry of Finance. nbr.gov.bd/uploads/sros/52._SRO-213-Ain-2024-65-Customs_Temporary_importation_(Direct_export_oriented)-Rules-New_.pdf.
- O’Shea, Brian J. 2015. Bangladesh Bond Warehouse Regime: Assessment + Recommendations. World Bank Group, March 10, 2015. Copy hosted by the Customs Bond Commissionerate, Dhaka. cbc.gov.bd/assets/document/publication/publication_1732620215YN1q7U3C76dvpBE.pdf.
- Rahman, Mohammad Masudur. 2023. “Bangladesh LDC Graduation and Impact on Export Subsidies.” ISAS Working Paper No. 366. Singapore: Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. www.isas.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/WORKING-PAPER-366_newV2.pdf.
- Razzaque, Mohammad A. 2021. Bangladesh en Route to LDC Graduation: Firm-Level Preparedness in the Textile and Clothing Sector. New York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/Garment-Study-Bangladesh.pdf.
- Razzaque, Mohammad Abdur, Deen Islam, and Jillur Rahman. 2023. Can Bangladesh Absorb LDC Graduation-Induced Tariff Hikes? Evidence Using Product-Specific Price Elasticities of Demand and Markups for Apparel Exports to Europe. Final report BGD-23078. London: International Growth Centre. www.theigc.org/sites/default/files/2025-04/Razzaque-et-al-Final%20Report-September-2023.pdf.
- Rhee, Yung Whee, and Therese Belot. 1990. Export Catalysts in Low-Income Countries: A Review of Eleven Success Stories. World Bank Discussion Papers 72. Washington, DC: World Bank. documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/474231468740371757/pdf/multi-page.pdf.
- Rhee, Yung Whee. 1990. “The Catalyst Model of Development: Lessons from Bangladesh’s Success with Garment Exports.” World Development 18 (2): 333–46. doi.org/10.1016/0305-750X(90)90057-5.
- Shah, Jahangir. 2026. “Bangladesh’s LDC Graduation Postponed by 3 Years to November 2029.” Prothom Alo English, October 30, 2026. en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/addcsizr3s.
- SOAS ACE (Anti-Corruption Evidence Research Consortium). n.d. “Smuggling and Enforcement of Tax Codes in the Garments Industry in Bangladesh.” Project page. London: SOAS University of London. Accessed November 22, 2026. ace.soas.ac.uk/?p=11673.
- UNB (United News of Bangladesh). 2026. “2 RMG Exporters’ Tax Evasion Caught by NBR.” The Financial Express (Dhaka), November 2, 2026. thefinancialexpress.com.bd/trade/2-rmg-exporters-tax-evasion-caught-by-nbr.
- World Bank. 2023. Bangladesh Development Update, October 2023: New Frontiers in Poverty Reduction. Dhaka: World Bank Office. thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/cf07cf58f2c345063c972a47209b8c11-0310012023/original/Bangladesh-Development-Update-October-2023.pdf.
- WTO (World Trade Organization). 1994. “Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.” In The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 229–72. Geneva: WTO. www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf.
- WTO (World Trade Organization). 2020. Trade Impacts of LDC Graduation. Drafting led by Taufiqur Rahman. Geneva: WTO and Enhanced Integrated Framework. www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/trade_impacts_of_ldc_graduation.pdf.
- Yunus, Mohammad, and Tatsufumi Yamagata. 2012. “The Garment Industry in Bangladesh.” Chapter 6 in Dynamics of the Garment Industry in Low-Income Countries: Experience of Asia and Africa (Interim Report), edited by Takahiro Fukunishi. Chiba: IDE-JETRO. www.ide.go.jp/library/Japanese/Publish/Reports/InterimReport/2011/pdf/410_ch6.pdf.
Sources
Checked . Rules and figures change, so confirm anything that affects your pricing.
- Bangladesh Bank (2026), FEPD-1 Circular 30: consolidated import rules, Part G on back-to-back LCs (opens in a new tab)
- Bangladesh Bank (2026), FEPD-1 Circular 24: master circular on the Export Development Fund (opens in a new tab)
- Bangladesh Bank (2026), FEPD-1 Circulars 17 and 19: cash incentives for FY2026–27 (in Bangla) (opens in a new tab)
- NBR (2024), S.R.O. 213: bonded warehouse rules for direct export-oriented garment factories (in Bangla) (opens in a new tab)
- Bangladesh Bank, Major Economic Indicators, July 2026: back-to-back LC openings and liabilities (opens in a new tab)
- O’Shea (2015), Bangladesh Bond Warehouse Regime: Assessment + Recommendations, World Bank (opens in a new tab)
- WTO (1994), Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (opens in a new tab)
- WTO (2020), Trade Impacts of LDC Graduation (opens in a new tab)
- IMF (2025), Country Report 25/150, Bangladesh: third and fourth programme reviews (opens in a new tab)
- Rhee and Belot (1990), Export Catalysts in Low-Income Countries, World Bank Discussion Papers 72 (opens in a new tab)
- Razzaque (2021), Bangladesh en Route to LDC Graduation, UN DESA (opens in a new tab)