In short
Supplier surveys agree that buyers of Bangladeshi garments often give short lead times, long payment terms and late changes, and that many suppliers accept some orders below their own cost. The real unit value of US apparel imports from Bangladesh fell about 25% from 1997 to 2021, though it rose in current dollars. Links to wages and hours are consistent but correlational.
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This chapter is part of a research guide to the Bangladesh garment trade, which has the literature review, the method and the full bibliography.
This chapter is about the commercial terms on which garments are ordered from Bangladesh: the price a buyer pays, the time it allows, when it pays, and how often it changes or cancels what it ordered. The literature calls these “purchasing practices”. They are different from the codes of conduct and audits that buyers use to check working conditions, and much of the research asks whether the first undoes the second.
I try to answer two questions. Have the terms that Bangladeshi suppliers get from buyers worsened, and how good is the evidence that they have? And does the behaviour of buyers, rather than competition among suppliers, explain the pressure on wages, hours and compliance inside factories? I then look at the COVID-19 cancellations of 2020, which tested who carries the risk when demand collapses, and at the European and German laws that now name purchasing practices as part of corporate due diligence.
Two subjects are covered on other pages and I do not repeat them. Wage levels and the history of the minimum wage are in the guide to garment worker wages. The timeline of the pandemic in the industry is in the cited history of the industry. Chapter 1 describes the steps of an order and how long each takes; this chapter is about the terms on which the order is placed.
Three kinds of evidence, each with its own blind spot
Research on purchasing practices in Bangladesh rests on three kinds of evidence. The first is trade data. Import statistics give a value and a quantity for each exporting country, and dividing one by the other gives a unit value, a rough price. Trade data cover every shipment, but they cannot tell a lower price from a cheaper product. The second is surveys of suppliers, which ask factories about the prices, lead times and payment terms they receive. Surveys reach what trade data cannot, but the answers come from one side of the bargain, and the samples are rarely random. The third, and newest, is firm-level data that link particular buyers to particular orders. It is the most precise and the scarcest.
The definitions are broadly shared. The ILO’s global survey of 2016 grouped the practices that may affect wages and conditions into five: contract clauses, technical specifications, order placement and lead times, prices and market power, and requests for social standards (ILO 2017, 3). The Better Buying index, now run by Cascale, rates buyers in seven categories: planning and forecasting, design and development, cost and cost negotiation, sourcing and order placement, payment and terms, management of the purchasing process, and “win-win sustainable partnership” (Cascale 2025, 4). The Common Framework for Responsible Purchasing Practices, written in 2022 by four multi-stakeholder initiatives, sets five principles: integration and reporting, equal partnership, collaborative production planning, fair payment terms and sustainable costing (ETI et al. 2022). The three lists use different words for the same four things: how much notice a supplier gets, what it is paid, when it is paid, and what happens when the buyer changes its mind.
Prices: what import data show
Anner’s price squeeze and sourcing squeeze
The most cited argument is Mark Anner’s. He argues that since the early 2000s the imbalance of power between buyers and suppliers in apparel has grown, not shrunk (Anner 2020b, 2). Buyers have consolidated while the supply base has spread across more countries, and the end of the quota system and China’s entry to the WTO gave buyers more places to go (Anner 2020b, 4–5). Anner names two mechanisms. The “price squeeze” is the fall in what lead firms pay suppliers. The “sourcing squeeze” is the use of the same bargaining power to cut lead times, shift order sizes and change specifications at short notice (Anner 2020b, 5). The first, he argues, reaches workers as low wages and harder work; the second as overtime and unauthorised subcontracting (Anner 2020b, 2, 6).
His price evidence starts with US import data. Dividing the value of apparel imports by their area in square metres gives dollars per square metre, and Anner reads a fall in that figure for all US apparel imports from 1998, sharper after China joined the WTO and after Vietnam joined in 2007, interrupted by a rise from 2010 to 2012 that he puts down to the spike in cotton prices (Anner 2020b, 10–11). For Bangladesh he looks at its largest product in the US market, men’s and boys’ cotton trousers. In his 2018 report he gives a nominal fall of 13% in the price of trousers since the Rana Plaza collapse, and he answers the two obvious objections: the taka fell by only 3.8% between 2013 and 2017, and cotton prices rose by 22.13% between 2015 and 2017 while trouser prices fell (Anner 2018, 5). In Europe, Bangladesh became the largest supplier of T-shirts at €10.92 a kilogram in 2017, against €14.93 for China and €15.78 for India (Anner 2020b, 13).
The same comparison of cotton and trouser prices appears with two different figures. The 2018 report says trouser prices fell by 11.48% from 2015 to 2017 (Anner 2018, 5); the journal article says 10.24% for the same period (Anner 2020b, 13). I could not find which is the corrected one. Neither changes the direction of the finding.
Anner is clear about the limits of the method. A unit value per square metre is useful for the same product over time, but for a bundle of goods a change in value “may reflect a shift in products” (Anner 2020b, 9). His series are nominal, and he notes that adjusting for inflation would make the fall steeper (Anner 2020b, 11). He also treats trade values as CIF, that is, including freight and insurance, while most contracts are agreed FOB, which is why he adds a survey of factory prices (Anner 2020b, 14). On this last point the US statistics may be closer to FOB than he says: the Census Bureau values imports at customs value, which excludes freight and insurance (US Census Bureau 2022). I could not confirm from OTEXA’s own pages which value its country reports use.
The aggregate series for Bangladesh
Anner’s Bangladesh figures are for trousers. I wanted to see what the whole of Bangladesh’s apparel trade with the United States looks like on the same basis, so I built table 1 from the US Office of Textiles and Apparel (OTEXA). OTEXA’s live site would not open from my connection on 22 November 2026, so the figures come from archived copies of its Major Shippers Report for Bangladesh, one for each year from 1999 to 2022. Each report gives the two previous calendar years, and I took every year from one of the last reports that list it; the few later archived copies revise the figures by less than 0.01%. I did not use any figure I could not open, which is why the table stops at 2021.
| Year | Value, US$ million | Quantity, million SME | Unit value, US$ per SME (nominal) | Unit value, 2021 US$ per SME | Value read from report with data through | Quantity read from report with data through |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1997 | 1,447.810 | 671.763 | 2.16 | 3.64 | 7/1999 | 8/1999 |
| 1998 | 1,626.555 | 743.516 | 2.19 | 3.64 | 7/2000 | 9/2000 |
| 1999 | 1,675.692 | 773.077 | 2.17 | 3.53 | 7/2000 | 10/2001 |
| 2000 | 2,115.920 | 966.612 | 2.19 | 3.44 | 8/2002 | 10/2002 |
| 2001 | 2,101.219 | 965.942 | 2.18 | 3.33 | 6/2003 | 8/2003 |
| 2002 | 1,883.155 | 927.717 | 2.03 | 3.06 | 10/2004 | 9/2004 |
| 2003 | 1,848.066 | 913.029 | 2.02 | 2.98 | 9/2005 | 4/2005 |
| 2004 | 1,977.557 | 941.685 | 2.10 | 3.01 | 7/2006 | 8/2006 |
| 2005 | 2,371.734 | 1,124.830 | 2.11 | 2.93 | 10/2007 | 10/2007 |
| 2006 | 2,914.090 | 1,306.919 | 2.23 | 3.00 | 8/2008 | 8/2008 |
| 2007 | 3,103.346 | 1,351.828 | 2.30 | 3.00 | 10/2009 | 10/2009 |
| 2008 | 3,441.642 | 1,436.237 | 2.40 | 3.02 | 10/2010 | 10/2010 |
| 2009 | 3,409.775 | 1,383.833 | 2.46 | 3.11 | 8/2011 | 8/2011 |
| 2010 | 3,930.358 | 1,606.063 | 2.45 | 3.04 | 3/2012 | 3/2012 |
| 2011 | 4,509.864 | 1,539.527 | 2.93 | 3.53 | 3/2013 | 3/2013 |
| 2012 | 4,469.978 | 1,521.916 | 2.94 | 3.47 | 7/2014 | 7/2014 |
| 2013 | 4,947.540 | 1,692.447 | 2.92 | 3.40 | 7/2015 | 7/2015 |
| 2014 | 4,834.111 | 1,609.705 | 3.00 | 3.44 | 10/2016 | 10/2016 |
| 2015 | 5,404.512 | 1,871.422 | 2.89 | 3.30 | 9/2017 | 9/2017 |
| 2016 | 5,303.927 | 1,861.122 | 2.85 | 3.22 | 8/2018 | 8/2018 |
| 2017 | 5,063.972 | 1,851.104 | 2.74 | 3.02 | 9/2019 | 9/2019 |
| 2018 | 5,397.796 | 1,933.510 | 2.79 | 3.01 | 10/2020 | 10/2020 |
| 2019 | 5,921.074 | 2,008.762 | 2.95 | 3.12 | 10/2021 | 10/2021 |
| 2020 | 5,227.919 | 1,889.092 | 2.77 | 2.90 | 6/2022 | 6/2022 |
| 2021 | 7,146.079 | 2,604.155 | 2.74 | 2.74 | 8/2022 | 8/2022 |
Three things stand out. First, in current dollars the unit value of Bangladesh’s apparel in the US market did not fall over the long run: it rose from US$2.16 per square metre equivalent in 1997 to US$2.74 in 2021, by about 27%. In 2021 dollars it fell from US$3.64 to US$2.74, by about 25%. Whether one sees a price squeeze in these figures depends first on whether one deflates them. Second, there are clear episodes of decline. The nominal unit value fell from US$2.19 in 2000 to US$2.02 in 2003, in the last years of quotas, and from a peak of US$3.00 in 2014 to US$2.74 in 2017, the years after Rana Plaza and the 2013 minimum wage rise, a fall of about 9%. That second episode is the one Anner describes. Third, the jump from US$2.45 in 2010 to US$2.93 in 2011 matches the cotton spike he names, and prices never returned to their 2010 level in nominal terms.
The table cannot say why unit values moved. A change in the mix of products, in fabric weight, in the share of cheaper basics, or in how square metre equivalents are converted would all move the figure without any change in what a buyer pays for a given garment. One crude check is the split between cotton and man-made fibre: man-made fibre apparel was 27.4% of the dollar value in 2005 and 25.0% in 2021, so that particular shift is small (my calculation from OTEXA 1999–2022a). A proper test would need product-level series, which OTEXA publishes by category and which a researcher with access to the live site could build.
What suppliers report about their buyers
Table 2 sets four surveys next to each other. They point the same way on most questions, but they are built differently, and the differences matter for how far each can be trusted.
| Survey and dates | Who answered | Prices and costs | Time and changes | Payment | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ILO and joint ETIs global survey, July–October 2016 | 1,454 suppliers in 87 countries, all sectors, from a pool of 41,387 drawn mainly from the Sedex database | 39% accepted orders below cost in the past year; 52% in textiles and clothing. In Bangladesh, 17% of customers were willing to reflect minimum wage rises in prices | 17% said their orders had enough lead time. In Bangladesh, 38% had some unwritten contracts | Not reported | ILO 2017, 1, 3, 6, 7, 9 |
| Anner’s survey of Bangladeshi factories, March 2016–March 2017 | 223 factory owners and managers in Gazipur, Mirpur, Savar, Ashulia and Sripur | Average FOB price US$5.03 in 2011 and US$4.64 in 2016, a fall of 7.75%; 87% said buyers did not raise prices after the 2013 minimum wage rise; mean profit margin 7.69% in 2016 | Lead time 93.4 days in 2011 and 85.83 days in 2016; 26% said buyers “often” change specifications after production starts, 55% “sometimes” | Payment time after shipment up 19.72% | Anner 2020b, 9, 14–17 |
| Better Buying Purchasing Practices Index, April–June 2025 | 1,360 suppliers giving 1,598 ratings, of which 1,340 rated 35 buyers in soft goods; 88 suppliers headquartered in Bangladesh; 281 soft-goods ratings from South Asia | 43.2% said all their orders covered the cost of compliant production; 51% faced high-pressure cost negotiation | 84.6% received a forecast; Planning and Forecasting fell from 59 to 56 points | 43.6% had terms of 60 days or less; South Asia had the lowest Payment and Terms score of eight regions (64) | Cascale 2025, 6, 11, 13, 16, 18, 23, 38 |
| Anner’s survey during COVID-19, July–August 2020 | 75 suppliers in 15 countries, the largest group in Bangladesh | Buyers demanded price cuts averaging 12% on new orders; 56% accepted some orders below cost | 34% were given no flexibility on shipment dates for distancing measures | Average wait after shipment 77 days, against 43 days before the pandemic | Anner 2020c, 2, 4, 6 |
Anner’s survey of Bangladeshi factories
Anner’s team visited 223 factories between March 2016 and March 2017. The sample began as a random draw from the government’s factory list for Gazipur and Mirpur and was widened to other areas when those were exhausted; 55% of the factories made goods directly for European brands, 13% for US brands and 26% through buying houses (Anner 2020b, 9). The report that first published the results adds a detail the article leaves out: access to factories was eased by cover letters and calls from the BGMEA (Anner 2018, 6). That is how factory surveys in Bangladesh usually get done, but it means the sample is of factories willing to be visited on an association’s introduction.
The survey asked owners to recall prices, lead times and margins for 2011 as well as 2016, so the change it reports rests on memory. The two publications also give slightly different results from the same data. The 2018 report gives an FOB fall of 7.79%, with 10.67% for US buyers and 9.04% for European buyers (Anner 2018, 6); the journal article gives 7.75%, 10.71% and 8.96% (Anner 2020b, 14). The journal figures match its own table of average prices, so I use them in table 2. Kabeer, Huq and Sulaiman, citing the 2018 report, give 10.7% and 9.04% (Kabeer, Huq, and Sulaiman 2020, 31). Anner also warns that profit margins are “one of the more delicate questions” to ask an owner, and that very large firms might have margins of around 15% and very small ones under 5% (Anner 2018, 7).
The ILO global survey
The ILO survey is larger and covers every sector. It was sent between July and October 2016 to 41,387 suppliers, most of them taken from the Sedex database, and 1,454 replied from 87 countries (ILO 2017, 1). That is a response rate of about 3.5%, from a pool taken mostly from Sedex, a database through which suppliers share ethical-trade data with their customers, so it is not a random sample of the world’s suppliers. The survey was run with the Ethical Trading Initiatives of Denmark, Norway and the United Kingdom, whose practical guide for buyers draws on the same answers (ETIs 2017).
Its findings on Bangladesh are few but specific. Thirty-eight per cent of Bangladeshi suppliers had some unwritten contracts with buyers, against 35% across the sample (ILO 2017, 3); only 17% of their customers were willing to reflect a minimum wage increase in the price, against 25% on average, and suppliers waited an average of 12 weeks before any increase came through (ILO 2017, 9); and Bangladeshi suppliers outsourced 15% of production, against 12% on average (ILO 2017, 20).
This survey is easy to misquote, because it contains two different figures of 52%. One is the share of textile and clothing suppliers that accepted orders below cost (ILO 2017, 7). The other is given for Bangladesh in a passage about suppliers that sold below cost under pressure from buyers: one-third of all below-cost sellers said so, “nearly half” in the garment sector (46%), and 52% among Bangladeshi suppliers (ILO 2017, 8). The chart beside that passage counts only suppliers that had sold below cost, so I read the 52% as a share of Bangladeshi below-cost sellers, but the brief’s wording does not state the base, and it can be read as a share of all Bangladeshi respondents. Anner’s 2018 report gives 52% as the share of “supplier factories” that accepted below-cost orders, without saying that this is the textile and clothing figure; the ILO’s figure for all sectors is 39% (Anner 2018, 4; ILO 2017, 7). His journal article takes the second reading of the Bangladesh figure: 52% of Bangladeshi respondents sold below cost under buyer pressure. It also gives 46% as the share of textile and clothing suppliers that accepted below-cost orders, quoting the brief’s words for that question, but the brief’s figure for that question is 52%, and its 46% is the garment share of below-cost sellers who cited buyer pressure (Anner 2020b, 15; ILO 2017, 7–8). Readers should go back to pages 7 and 8 of the ILO brief before quoting any of these numbers.
The Better Buying index
Better Buying, whose 2025 rating cycle was the first run by Cascale (Cascale 2025, 3), collects ratings of named buyers from their suppliers. The design has strengths and a clear bias, and both should be stated. Suppliers rate anonymously, and the raw data and identities are withheld, which makes candour more likely (Cascale 2025, 34, 37). But the buyers pay to take part: in 2025, 23 subscribing companies gave Better Buying their supplier lists and invitation letters, and those buyers accounted for 1,314 of the 1,340 soft-goods ratings (Cascale 2025, 6, 34). The sample is therefore not random. It is drawn from the suppliers of buyers who chose to be rated, who may not be typical buyers, and response rates ranged from 27.2% to 100% between subscribers (Cascale 2025, 34). The report itself warns that its regional results “should not be generalized as fully representative” (Cascale 2025, 4).
With that caveat, the 2025 results are informative. The overall score fell from 67 to 66 out of 100; Sourcing and Order Placement scored lowest at 29; and Planning and Forecasting fell most, from 59 to 56, with 37.1% of suppliers naming it as the area most in need of improvement (Cascale 2025, 6–7). The share of suppliers saying that all their orders were priced to cover the cost of compliant production fell from 48.9% to 43.2% (Cascale 2025, 16). Fifty-one per cent reported high-pressure cost negotiation, most often “take it or leave it” target prices (53.6%), a demand to hold prices level year to year (46.4%) and the sharing of competitors’ bids (42.5%) (Cascale 2025, 18–19). Better Buying recommends payment terms of 60 days or less; 43.6% of suppliers had them, and suppliers in China and South Asia more often reported terms of 91 days or longer (Cascale 2025, 23). Ratings from South Asia (281 ratings; 239 of the 1,360 suppliers had their headquarters in South Asia, 88 of them in Bangladesh) gave buyers the lowest Payment and Terms score of the eight regions (Cascale 2025, 10–11, 38). Better Buying does not publish a Bangladesh-only result.
The surveys agree on the direction of most findings: tight lead times, below-cost orders, long payment terms and late changes are common, and they are reported more often by suppliers in low-wage countries. They do not support precise statements about trends in Bangladesh, because none of them has measured the same Bangladeshi suppliers on the same questions over time.
From purchasing to the shop floor: wages, hours, subcontracting and compliance
The mechanism proposed in the literature is simple to state. A supplier that is paid less, or given less time, must find the difference somewhere. Anner sets out the routes: holding down real wages, raising production targets so that workers sew more pieces an hour, hiring fewer workers and covering peaks with overtime, sending work to smaller subcontractors that buyers have not authorised, and choosing cheap buildings because rent is a fixed cost while orders are not (Anner 2020b, 6–7). He draws the last point from Michael Piore and links it to Rana Plaza (Anner 2020b, 6–7, 16).
The ILO survey is the only source I found that tests these links statistically across many suppliers. In a regression on 1,130 suppliers, with controls that include firm size and sector, being pushed to accept prices below cost was associated with hourly wages 11.33% lower, and buyers paying at least the cost of production with wages 9.74% higher (ILO 2017, 14). Having fewer than half of orders with enough lead time was associated with 2.74% longer weekly hours (ILO 2017, 17). Below-cost prices were associated with 20% more temporary workers and 16% more outsourced production (ILO 2017, 19–20). In their own answers, 59% of suppliers said short lead times caused overtime (ILO 2017, 15). The authors call the results “conclusive evidence” that purchasing practices make a difference (ILO 2017, 15). I would not go that far. The data are cross-sectional, the practices and the outcomes are both reported by the same manager, and suppliers who treat their workers badly may also be the ones who win only the worst-paid orders. The associations are strong and consistent; the direction of cause is argued, not shown.
Evidence from workers in Bangladesh points the same way on hours. Anner’s survey of 188 workers in 2017 found an average week of 63.49 hours, with 77.2% saying overtime was obligatory; his question on whether production targets had risen was answered by only 23 workers, and he calls that result “very tentative” (Anner 2020b, 18). Kabeer, Huq and Sulaiman, surveying 1,500 workers from 240 factories around Dhaka in 2017, found average overtime of 3.3 hours a day in busy periods against a legal limit of two, and 83% saying overtime was compulsory (Kabeer, Huq, and Sulaiman 2020, 8, 18). They conclude that the purchasing practices of lead buyers worked against the financial position of suppliers after Rana Plaza (Kabeer, Huq, and Sulaiman 2020, 31). Neither study links an individual worker’s hours to a particular buyer’s order, so they show the conditions that the purchasing argument predicts, not the link itself. For wages, see the wages guide.
Anner’s separate study of India, which I could read only in abstract, describes the same pattern there: “predatory purchasing practices” arising from growing power asymmetries, with downward pressure on wages and more non-standard employment (Anner 2019). The Bangladesh article is sometimes cited as Anner (2019) because it first appeared online that year; the two are different studies.
The case against a simple buyer-power story
Not every scholar reads the evidence as proof that buyers dictate terms. There are three serious counter-arguments, and the sources above contain some of them.
The first is that competition among suppliers, not the will of buyers, sets the price. The ILO survey asked suppliers why they accepted orders below cost. Fifty-five per cent said it was to keep their competitive advantage over other suppliers and 77% said it was to secure future orders; only one-third of below-cost sellers said buyer pressure was a reason, and 14% said their own costing mistakes were at least sometimes to blame (ILO 2017, 8). Follow-up qualitative studies found that below-cost orders were not the majority of a supplier’s orders, and that suppliers tried to make up the loss on more profitable ones, which is harder for those with few buyers (ILO 2017, 7). Anner himself ends his article by describing “a crisis of overcapacity” created by a development model in which every poor country tries to export apparel at once (Anner 2020b, 23–24). Buyer power and supplier overcapacity are not rival explanations so much as two sides of the same market, but they lead to different remedies: one points to buyers’ contracts, the other to the number of factories chasing orders.
The second is that buyers are not all alike. Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon argued that as suppliers learned to source fabric and offer full-package production, apparel chains moved from “captive” towards “relational” forms with less power imbalance; Anner sets out their view in order to dispute it (Anner 2020b, 1–3). The strongest recent evidence on the point comes from economics. Using Bangladeshi customs records for 2005 to 2012 and order-level data on fabric and labour, Cajal-Grossi, Macchiavello and Noguera show that exporters earn higher markups on otherwise identical woven orders made for “relational” buyers, who concentrate orders among few suppliers, than for “spot” buyers (Cajal-Grossi, Macchiavello, and Noguera 2023, 2391, 2414). A shift from the average buyer’s strategy to that of one strongly relational buyer, about one standard deviation on their measure, is associated with an 11% higher average markup, and a rough calculation puts the value of supplying a relational buyer at no less than 30% of a year’s profits from the relationship (Cajal-Grossi, Macchiavello, and Noguera 2023, 2395). Their model suggests that too few buyers choose to be relational (Cajal-Grossi, Macchiavello, and Noguera 2023, 2395–96). This supports the view that purchasing practices matter, but it cuts against treating “buyers” as one actor with one strategy.
The third concerns compliance. If buyers punished suppliers for the cost of compliance, compliant factories should lose orders. Distelhorst and Locke, using compliance and purchasing records for more than two thousand manufacturing establishments in 36 countries, find the opposite: achieving compliance was associated with an average 4% increase in annual purchasing, driven largely by apparel (Distelhorst and Locke 2018). They cannot say whether compliance was achieved at no cost to price or whether buyers paid more, and they note that most of the exporters they study remained non-compliant (Distelhorst and Locke 2018). Kabeer, Huq and Sulaiman put the other side: buyers that insist on compliance “do not necessarily reward compliant factories by improving the terms they offer” (Kabeer, Huq, and Sulaiman 2020, 32). The two findings can both be true. A buyer may give a compliant factory more orders while paying no more per piece; the first is volume, the second price.
My own reading is that the evidence for worse terms is strongest on time and payment, where the surveys agree and the questions are concrete, and weakest on price, where unit values are confounded by product mix and the survey figures rest on recall. The evidence that terms affect conditions is consistent but correlational. The claim that buyer power, rather than supplier competition, is the root cause is an interpretation the data cannot yet settle.
COVID-19: who carried the cost of cancelled orders
The history of the industry during the pandemic is told in the cited history. Here I look only at what the episode showed about purchasing terms. When stores closed in Europe, the United States and elsewhere in March 2020 (Anner 2020a, 7), buyers cancelled or suspended orders that were already in production or finished. The episode tested in a few weeks what the surveys above can only infer: when demand collapses, which side of the contract absorbs the loss?
Contracts and force majeure
The ILO survey had already found that only 45% of written contracts said who would bear the cost of changes to orders (ILO 2017, 4), and that 38% of Bangladeshi suppliers had some unwritten contracts (ILO 2017, 3). In March 2020 many buyers invoked force majeure. Anner, citing a fashion lawyer and international principles of contract law, argued that most such clauses do not name pandemics, and that a force majeure claim belongs to the party with the main obligation to perform, here the factories making the goods, not the buyers that had agreed to pay for them (Anner 2020a, 5). That is a legal argument made in an advocacy report, not a ruling. In the survey he ran from 21 to 25 March, when orders were cancelled, 72.1% of buyers refused to pay for fabric the supplier had already bought and 91.3% refused to pay the cut-make-trim cost, and 58% of suppliers had shut most or all of their operations (Anner 2020a, 1). Payment delays had begun even before the cancellations: 68.8% of suppliers reported delays of more than ten days beyond the agreed terms (Anner 2020a, 4).
The survey has its own inconsistency. Its text gives “a lot” of orders cancelled for 23.4% of suppliers and “most” for 22.3%, while its table gives 23.3% and 23.7% (Anner 2020a, 5). The table’s counts (132, 64, 61 and 16) add up to 273 of the 316 respondents, and the percentages in the text, like the headline 45.8%, are those counts divided by 273; the table’s own percentage column does not match its counts (my calculation).
How large, and how much came back
Table 3 shows how the totals moved as the count went on. They are not competing estimates of one number. They count different things (on hold or cancelled; in production or planned), at different dates, for different groups of factories. The BGMEA figures come from its members’ own reports, which nobody audited, and the Associated Press report of the early BGMEA totals noted that they were conservative because they left out orders that would go to more than one buyer (Alam 2020).
| Date of the figure | Who counted | What was counted | Figure | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| To 22 March 2020 | Press reports, as cited by Anner | Bangladesh garment exports cancelled by buyers | US$1.44 billion | Anner 2020a, 5 |
| 21–25 March 2020 | Online survey of 316 suppliers | Suppliers with “a lot” to “most” of their in-process or finished orders cancelled; with all cancelled | 45.8%; 5.9% | Anner 2020a, 1 |
| Released 30 March 2020 | BGMEA, from factories’ reports | Orders on hold; orders cancelled; planned orders for April–December cancelled | US$1.8 billion; US$1.4 billion; nearly US$1.7 billion | Alam 2020 |
| Reported 31 March 2020 | BGMEA president | Orders cancelled or held up, reported by 1,048 factories | Over 900 million pieces, US$2.9 billion | Paul 2020 |
| Reported 31 March 2020 | BGMEA and BKMEA | Expected loss of export revenue in the 2019–20 financial year | Roughly US$6 billion | Paul 2020 |
| To mid-April 2020, reported October 2020 | BGMEA | Orders cancelled or held up, reported by 1,134 factories; by buyer region | 975.20 million pieces, US$3.18 billion (EU US$1.93 billion; US US$574 million; Canada US$52 million; other markets US$620 million) | Maritime Gateway 2020 |
| Data received mid-May, published 25 June 2020 | The Daily Star, from factory submissions to BGMEA, cleaned for duplicates | Orders delayed, put on hold or cancelled by at least 1,931 brands | About US$3.7 billion | Preetha and Islam 2020 |
| To 20 May 2020, published 25 June 2020 | BGMEA president, as reported by The Daily Star | Share of their initial cancellations that the brands had reinstated | Up to 58% | Preetha and Islam 2020 |
| 18 September 2020 | BGMEA president | Share of the US$3.18 billion reinstated | 80–90% | Associated Press 2020 |
| October 2020 | BGMEA president | Share of cancelled orders reinstated, “mostly at discounts and deferred payment terms” | About 90% | Maritime Gateway 2020 |
| July–August 2020 | Online survey of 75 suppliers in 15 countries | Suppliers saying all or most of their cancelled orders had been paid in full; saying less than a quarter had | 27%; 47% | Anner 2020c, 4 |
| Web page dated November 2025 | Worker Rights Consortium | Retroactive cancellations worldwide (estimate); payments it says campaigners helped restore | US$40 billion; US$22 billion | Worker Rights Consortium 2025 |
The clearest disagreement is about recovery. The BGMEA president said that by 20 May 2020 brands had reinstated up to 58% of their initial cancellations (Preetha and Islam 2020), in September that 80–90% of the US$3.18 billion had been reinstated (Associated Press 2020), and in October that about 90% had been, “mostly at discounts and deferred payment terms” (Maritime Gateway 2020). Anner’s survey of July and August found that only 27% of suppliers said all or most of their cancelled orders had been paid in full (Anner 2020c, 4). The two can both be accurate. One measures the value of orders reinstated, on whatever terms; the other measures the share of suppliers paid in full, across fifteen countries. Together they suggest that most of the business came back but much of it came back cheaper and later. Anner’s survey found buyers demanding average price cuts of 12% on new orders and the average wait for payment rising from 43 to 77 days (Anner 2020c, 2). The 12% average includes suppliers who reported no cut (Anner 2020c, 5).
Public pressure seems to have moved some buyers. Of the ten large buyers of Bangladeshi clothing that Anner’s addendum of 1 April 2020 listed as having made no commitment to pay for orders in production (Anner 2020a, 8), five, by my count, appear in the Worker Rights Consortium’s final tracker of April 2021 as having committed to pay in full (Worker Rights Consortium 2021). One of the five rests on my reading of a name the addendum appears to misspell; without it the count is four. The tracker classified buyers from public statements, correspondence and reports from suppliers and their associations (Worker Rights Consortium 2021), not from audited payment records. The Consortium’s later figures of US$40 billion cancelled worldwide and US$22 billion restored come without a published method (Worker Rights Consortium 2025). For readers interested in how such losses are divided under a contract, CMB’s practical guide to who pays when an order goes wrong and its guide to payment terms describe the commercial side.
Regulation that now reaches purchasing practices
Before these laws, the best-known binding clause on buyers’ commercial terms in Bangladesh was in the 2013 Accord, which required signatory brands to negotiate terms that made it “financially feasible” for factories to keep workplaces safe (Anner 2018, 9). Anner sees in that clause a model for costing that covers the full price of compliant production (Anner 2020b, 23). Two laws now bring purchasing practices into general due diligence duties for large buyers.
The EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive, after “Omnibus I”
The directive adopted in 2024 (Directive (EU) 2024/1760) requires companies in scope, as one of the measures to prevent adverse impacts, to make “necessary modifications of, or improvements to” their business plans and operations, “including purchasing practices, design and distribution practices” (European Parliament and Council 2024, 117). Its recitals go further and say companies should develop “purchasing policies that contribute to living wages and incomes for their suppliers” (European Parliament and Council 2024, 40). Page numbers are those of the text the Council published for adoption; I checked the quoted wording against the Official Journal text (OJ L, 2024/1760, 5 July 2024), where the recital is number 46.
In February 2026 the EU amended the directive as part of the “Omnibus I” simplification package. The Council adopted the act on 24 February 2026, with Czechia voting against and Austria, Belgium and Bulgaria abstaining (Council of the European Union 2026). It was published in the Official Journal on 26 February 2026 as Directive (EU) 2026/470 and entered into force twenty days later, on 18 March 2026 (Directive (EU) 2026/470). In the text adopted, whose wording I checked against the Official Journal (European Parliament and Council 2026):
- the scope rises from companies with more than 1,000 employees and €450 million turnover to those with more than 5,000 employees and €1.5 billion turnover, and for non-EU companies to €1.5 billion turnover in the EU (European Parliament and Council 2026, 33, 89–90);
- member states must transpose the due diligence rules by 26 July 2028 and apply them from 26 July 2029 (European Parliament and Council 2026, 110);
- the specific EU-wide civil liability regime is removed, although member states must still ensure that victims receive full compensation where a company is held liable for a failure that caused damage (European Parliament and Council 2026, 42);
- the article on climate transition plans is deleted (European Parliament and Council 2026, 40, 105);
- companies scope their chains on “reasonably available” information, and should ask business partners with fewer than 5,000 employees for information only where it cannot be obtained otherwise (European Parliament and Council 2026, 35, 37).
The amending text replaces paragraph 6 of Article 10 and makes no other change to that article, so it leaves the purchasing-practices measure in Article 10(2)(d) unchanged (European Parliament and Council 2026, 98). So the obligation survives, but for far fewer companies and later than first planned, and it is a duty to take “appropriate measures” where relevant, not a rule on prices or payment days. Germany’s statement to the Council asked the Commission to say in its guidance that one test in the new risk-scoping article, Article 8(2a)(c), is cumulative, which narrows it, and France’s asked it to stop non-EU companies circumventing the turnover thresholds (Council of the European Union 2026); how the rules are interpreted will be settled in guidelines due by 26 July 2027 (European Parliament and Council 2026, 39).
Germany’s Supply Chain Due Diligence Act
Germany’s LkSG has applied since 1 January 2023 and, since 1 January 2024, to companies with at least 1,000 employees in Germany (Germany 2021; Bundesregierung 2025, 1). Among the preventive measures it requires is “the development and implementation of appropriate procurement strategies and purchasing practices” that prevent or minimise identified risks (§ 6(3) no. 2, my translation) (Germany 2021). In October 2025 the government tabled a bill to drop the reporting duty and to fine only serious breaches, keeping the due diligence duties themselves until a new law transposes the EU directive (Bundesregierung 2025, 1). The Bundestag held its first reading on 16 January 2026 and sent the bill to committee (Deutscher Bundestag 2026). The enforcement agency, BAFA, had already stopped checking companies’ reports on the government’s instruction (BAFA 2025). I could not confirm whether the bill had passed or been promulgated by 22 November 2026.
What these laws do and do not change for Bangladeshi suppliers
Neither law gives a Bangladeshi factory a right to a price, a lead time or a payment date. Both put duties on large buyers, enforced by authorities in Europe, and both treat purchasing practices as one possible cause of harm to be addressed “where relevant”. Whether they change terms on the factory floor will depend on enforcement and on how buyers document their own practices, which is a question for research from 2029 on. The trade context, including the EU’s tariff preferences, is in CMB’s guide to duty-free access to the EU until 2032.
What the research does not yet tell us
- A price series for the same garment over time. Unit values mix products, and survey prices rest on owners’ memory. No public source tracks the FOB price of a defined Bangladeshi product, such as a basic cotton T-shirt of a given weight, year by year. Order-level customs data, of the kind Cajal-Grossi and co-authors used for 2005–2012, could, if made available for later years (Cajal-Grossi, Macchiavello, and Noguera 2023, 2414). Without it, the claim of a falling real price stays an inference.
- Whether OTEXA values are FOB or CIF, and why unit values moved after 2014. Table 1 shows a fall from 2014 to 2017 and again from 2019 to 2021. A decomposition by product category would show how much is mix and how much is price.
- Bangladesh-specific results from Better Buying. The index reports South Asia as one region, and subscribers’ own reports are private. A Bangladesh breakdown, even with wide margins of error, would be the only repeated, buyer-by-buyer measure for the country.
- Causal evidence on working conditions. The links between purchasing terms and wages, hours or subcontracting come from cross-sectional surveys in which the same manager reports both sides. A study that matched order records from buyers to payroll and hours data in the same factories would test the mechanism directly.
- What happened to suppliers that did not recover in 2020. The figures in table 3 are for value reinstated or for suppliers who answered a survey. No source I found follows the factories that closed, or the workers they dismissed, through to final settlement.
- The role of intermediaries. Twenty-six per cent of Anner’s factories sold through buying houses (Anner 2020b, 9), and the FOB prices his table gives for “trading houses” fell by 5.51% from 2011 to 2016, less than the 7.75% average (Anner 2020b, 15). Whether intermediaries pass on, absorb or add to buyers’ pressure has not been studied, and it matters for any law that reaches only the buyer.
- The effect of the new laws. The EU directive will apply from 2029 to companies of 5,000 or more employees. Which buyers of Bangladeshi clothing fall in scope, and whether their payment terms and lead times change, can be measured before and after.
How I researched this chapter
I carried out this review with the help of AI research tools, which searched for, read and summarised the sources and drafted the text to my brief; a separate AI check then reopened the sources and tested every figure, quotation and citation. I set the questions and the rules, and I am responsible for what is published here.
This chapter is a desk review of published research, reports, laws and trade data. I did no interviews or fieldwork. I read the sources on 22 November 2026 and cite only what I read on the page cited.
I read in full Anner’s journal article of 2020 (in a copy of the version first published online, whose page numbers I give), his reports of 2018 (“Binding Power”) and 2020 (“Abandoned?” and “Leveraging Desperation”), the ILO issue brief of 2017, the Better Buying report for 2025, the Common Framework for Responsible Purchasing Practices, the Council texts of the 2024 directive (the sections on prevention) and of the 2026 amending directive, the Council minutes of 24 February 2026, the German draft amendment, and the relevant sections of the LkSG. I read the introductory and data sections of Cajal-Grossi, Macchiavello and Noguera (2023), the abstract and introduction of Distelhorst and Locke (2018) in their accepted manuscript, and the method, working-hours and discussion sections of Kabeer, Huq and Sulaiman (2020). Of Anner’s 2019 study of India I read only the abstract. The ETIs’ guide I read only for its introduction. For the COVID-19 figures I read the press reports in table 3 in the places given in the references, two of them as republished by other outlets.
Table 1 was built from archived copies of OTEXA’s reports because the live site refused connections from my machine. I list the archive date of every report used in my research notes, and I did not use any OTEXA figure after 2021. The deflator is the US consumer price index, read through the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ data service. The unit values are my own calculation and should be cited as such.
EUR-Lex refused automated connections, so I read the Official Journal texts of the 2024 directive and the 2026 amending directive through the EU Publications Office and cite the Council’s texts for page numbers. What I could not verify: whether Germany’s amending bill has passed; the press report of US$1.44 billion cancelled by 22 March 2020, which I saw only as cited by Anner; BGMEA’s own database of cancellations, which I saw only through newspapers; the method behind the Worker Rights Consortium’s global totals; and whether OTEXA’s dollar values are customs values or include freight and insurance.
On my own position: I co-founded CMB Sourcing Ltd., which makes knitwear and caps in its own factory, the factory of our sister company, Collective Studio Ltd. (where I am Head of Growth), and sources other garments as a buying house. My firm is therefore a supplier to buyers and, for other products, a buyer from factories, and has an interest on both sides of the arguments in this chapter. I have tried to give the evidence against the buyer-power reading as fully as the evidence for it. Nothing in the chapter draws on CMB’s own orders or prices.
This chapter is published under CC BY 4.0, and each table can be downloaded as a CSV file. The guide’s method and full bibliography are on the guide’s main page; other datasets are on CMB’s data page.
References
Chicago author-date style. Web pages were read on 22 November 2026 unless the entry says otherwise.
- Alam, Julhas. 2020. “Bangladesh Garment Makers Say $3B in Orders Lost to Virus.” Associated Press, March 30, 2020. Read as republished by KUTV. kutv.com/news/coronavirus/bangladesh-garment-makers-say-3b-in-orders-lost-to-virus.
- Anner, Mark. 2018. Binding Power: The Sourcing Squeeze, Workers’ Rights, and Building Safety in Bangladesh Since Rana Plaza. Research report, March 22, 2018. University Park, PA: Penn State Center for Global Workers’ Rights. Read in the copy held by the Freie Universität Berlin. Its sixth page is misprinted “page 7”; I cite it as page 6. sites.wiwiss.fu-berlin.de/forschung/Garments/Medien/2018-Anner-Research-Report-Binding-Power.pdf.
- Anner, Mark. 2019. “Predatory Purchasing Practices in Global Apparel Supply Chains and the Employment Relations Squeeze in the Indian Garment Export Industry.” International Labour Review 158 (4): 705–27. Abstract only consulted. doi.org/10.1111/ilr.12149.
- Anner, Mark. 2020a. Abandoned? The Impact of Covid-19 on Workers and Businesses at the Bottom of Global Garment Supply Chains. Research report, March 27, 2020, with addendum of April 1, 2020. University Park, PA: Penn State Center for Global Workers’ Rights and Worker Rights Consortium. www.workersrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Abandoned-Penn-State-WRC-Report-March-27-2020.pdf.
- Anner, Mark. 2020b. “Squeezing Workers’ Rights in Global Supply Chains: Purchasing Practices in the Bangladesh Garment Export Sector in Comparative Perspective.” Review of International Political Economy 27 (2): 320–47. Page numbers cited in this chapter are those of the version first published online on June 27, 2019 (pages 1–28). doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2019.1625426.
- Anner, Mark. 2020c. Leveraging Desperation: Apparel Brands’ Purchasing Practices during Covid-19. Research report, October 16, 2020. University Park, PA: Penn State Center for Global Workers’ Rights, in association with the Worker Rights Consortium. ler.la.psu.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/26/2022/04/Leveraging-Desperation_October-16-2020.pdf.
- Associated Press. 2020. “Bangladesh Economy Shows Early Signs of Pandemic Recovery.” September 18, 2020. Read as republished by Spectrum News 13. mynews13.com/fl/orlando/ap-top-news/2020/09/18/bangladesh-economy-shows-early-signs-of-pandemic-recovery.
- BAFA (Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle). 2025. “Berichtspflicht” [Reporting obligation]. Web page, status November 7, 2025. In German. www.bafa.de/DE/Lieferketten/Berichtspflicht/berichtspflicht_node.html.
- BLS (US Bureau of Labor Statistics). 2026. “Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U): U.S. City Average, All Items,” series CUUR0000SA0, annual averages 1997–2021. Read through the BLS Public Data API. data.bls.gov/timeseries/CUUR0000SA0.
- Bundesregierung. 2025. Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Änderung des Lieferkettensorgfaltspflichtengesetzes: Entlastung der Unternehmen durch anwendungs- und vollzugsfreundliche Umsetzung [Draft act amending the Supply Chain Due Diligence Act]. Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 21/2474, October 29, 2025. In German. dserver.bundestag.de/btd/21/024/2102474.pdf.
- Cajal-Grossi, Julia, Rocco Macchiavello, and Guillermo Noguera. 2023. “Buyers’ Sourcing Strategies and Suppliers’ Markups in Bangladeshi Garments.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 138 (4): 2391–450. doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjad026.
- Cascale. 2025. Better Buying Purchasing Practices Index Report (BBPPI) 2025: Purchasing Practices Performance in Apparel, Footwear, and Household Textile Supply Chains. Cascale. cascale.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Cascale-BBPPI-Report-11-2025.pdf.
- Council of the European Union. 2026. “Draft Minutes, Council of the European Union (General Affairs), 24 February 2026.” Document 6803/26, March 13, 2026. Brussels. data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6803-2026-INIT/en/pdf.
- Deutscher Bundestag. 2026. “Lieferkettengesetz debattiert” [Supply chain act debated]. Textarchiv, January 16, 2026. In German. www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2026/kw03-de-lieferketten-1136308.
- Distelhorst, Greg, and Richard M. Locke. 2018. “Does Compliance Pay? Social Standards and Firm-Level Trade.” American Journal of Political Science 62 (3): 695–711. Read in the accepted manuscript of January 10, 2018. doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12372.
- Ethical Trading Initiative, Ethical Trade Norway, Partnership for Sustainable Textiles, and Fair Wear. 2022. The Common Framework for Responsible Purchasing Practices: Building Resilience in Textile Supply Chains. Version 1, June 2022. static1.squarespace.com/static/636ba8ae2fd47349a887dd92/t/642ecf75bca27075443eac29/1680789366782/CFRPP+full+Framework.pdf.
- ETIs (Ethical Trading Initiatives of Denmark, Norway and the United Kingdom). 2017. Guide to Buying Responsibly. London: Ethical Trading Initiative. www.ethicaltrade.org/sites/default/files/shared_resources/guide_to_buying_responsibly.pdf.
- European Parliament and Council of the European Union. 2024. Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence and Amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 and Regulation (EU) 2023/2859. PE-CONS 9/24, May 13, 2024; adopted as Directive (EU) 2024/1760. Brussels: Council of the European Union. data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/PE-9-2024-INIT/en/pdf.
- European Parliament and Council of the European Union. 2026. “Directive (EU) 2026/470 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 February 2026 Amending Directives 2006/43/EC, 2013/34/EU, (EU) 2022/2464 and (EU) 2024/1760 as Regards Certain Corporate Sustainability Reporting Requirements and Certain Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Requirements.” Official Journal of the European Union L, 2026/470, February 26, 2026. Read through the Publications Office of the European Union (CELEX 32026L0470). eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2026/470/oj/eng.
- European Parliament and Council of the European Union. 2026. Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Directives 2006/43/EC, 2013/34/EU, (EU) 2022/2464 and (EU) 2024/1760 as Regards Certain Corporate Sustainability Reporting Requirements and Certain Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Requirements (“Omnibus I”). PE-CONS 66/25, February 13, 2026. Brussels: Council of the European Union. data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/PE-66-2025-INIT/en/pdf.
- Germany. 2021. Gesetz über die unternehmerischen Sorgfaltspflichten zur Vermeidung von Menschenrechtsverletzungen in Lieferketten (Lieferkettensorgfaltspflichtengesetz, LkSG) [Supply Chain Due Diligence Act], July 16, 2021 (BGBl. I S. 2959). Consolidated text at gesetze-im-internet.de. In German. www.gesetze-im-internet.de/lksg/.
- ILO (International Labour Office). 2017. Purchasing Practices and Working Conditions in Global Supply Chains: Global Survey Results. INWORK Issue Brief 10, prepared by Daniel Vaughan-Whitehead and Luis Pinedo Caro. Geneva: ILO. www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_protect/@protrav/@travail/documents/publication/wcms_556336.pdf.
- Kabeer, Naila, Lopita Huq, and Munshi Sulaiman. 2020. “Paradigm Shift or Business as Usual? Workers’ Views on Multi-stakeholder Initiatives in Bangladesh.” Development and Change 51 (5): 1360–98. Page numbers cited in this chapter are those of the version first published online (Development and Change 0 (0): 1–39). doi.org/10.1111/dech.12574.
- Maritime Gateway. 2020. “Most RMG Orders Revived, but on Buyers’ Terms.” October 6, 2020. Reproduces a report from The Financial Express (Dhaka), which I could not find in its original place. www.maritimegateway.com/rmg-orders-revived-buyers-terms/.
- OTEXA (US Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Office of Textiles and Apparel). 1999–2022a. “Major Shippers Report: U.S. General Imports by Country, Bangladesh,” in million dollars (page msrcty/v5380). Reports with data through July 1999 to August 2022, read in copies archived by the Internet Archive; table 1 gives the report used for each year. web.archive.org/web/*/otexa.trade.gov/msrcty/v5380.htm.
- OTEXA (US Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Office of Textiles and Apparel). 1999–2022b. “Major Shippers Report: U.S. General Imports by Country, Bangladesh,” in million square metre equivalents (page msrcty/a5380). Reports with data through August 1999 to August 2022, read in copies archived by the Internet Archive; table 1 gives the report used for each year. web.archive.org/web/*/otexa.trade.gov/msrcty/a5380.htm.
- Paul, Ruma. 2020. “Garment Exporter Bangladesh Faces $6 Billion Hit as Top Retailers Cancel.” Reuters, March 31, 2020. Read as republished by Yahoo News, where the page is dated April 1, 2020. sg.news.yahoo.com/garment-exporter-bangladesh-faces-6-174821448.html.
- Preetha, Sushmita S., and Zyma Islam. 2020. “Is Foul Play the New Normal?” The Daily Star (Dhaka), June 25, 2020; updated July 16, 2023. www.thedailystar.net/business/news/foul-play-the-new-normal-1920733.
- US Census Bureau. 2022. “Description of the International Trade Statistical Program.” Guide to Foreign Trade Statistics, last revised October 4, 2022. Washington, DC: US Census Bureau. www.census.gov/foreign-trade/guide/sec2.html.
- Worker Rights Consortium. 2021. “Covid-19 Tracker: Which Brands Acted Responsibly toward Suppliers and Workers?” Last updated April 21, 2021. Washington, DC: Worker Rights Consortium, with the Penn State Center for Global Workers’ Rights. www.workersrights.org/issues/covid-19/tracker/.
- Worker Rights Consortium. 2025. “Push to ‘Pay Up’ Stops Brands from Stealing Billions during Pandemic.” Web page, published November 3, 2025 (date from the page’s metadata; no date is shown on the page). Washington, DC: Worker Rights Consortium. www.workersrights.org/our-work/impact/covid-19/.
Sources
Checked . Rules and figures change, so confirm anything that affects your pricing.
- Anner (2020), Squeezing workers’ rights in global supply chains, Review of International Political Economy (opens in a new tab)
- ILO (2017), Purchasing practices and working conditions in global supply chains: Global Survey results (opens in a new tab)
- Cascale (2025), Better Buying Purchasing Practices Index Report 2025 (opens in a new tab)
- Common Framework for Responsible Purchasing Practices (2022) (opens in a new tab)
- Cajal-Grossi, Macchiavello and Noguera (2023), Quarterly Journal of Economics (opens in a new tab)
- Anner (2020), Abandoned? The impact of Covid-19 on workers and businesses (opens in a new tab)
- Anner (2020), Leveraging Desperation: apparel brands’ purchasing practices during Covid-19 (opens in a new tab)
- OTEXA Major Shippers Report, Bangladesh (archived copies) (opens in a new tab)
- Directive (EU) 2026/470 (Omnibus I), Official Journal of the European Union (opens in a new tab)
- German draft act amending the LkSG, Drucksache 21/2474 (opens in a new tab)